Vol. XXXVII: 1 2007, pp. 59-82

“LATINOAMERICA”: REFLECTIONS AROUND GLOBALIZATION, STATE, NATIONHOOD, AND DEVELOPMENT

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I. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this paper is to analyze the relation between state and nation in the light of systemic changes since the late 1980s; a period of time that has been generally identified with the word “globalization”. This concept is still a rather loose one that does not yet define an established system, but rather, a period of rapid changes in the transformation of the global capitalist system. Two major changes that we want to point out are: a) the emergence of the United Nations System in 1945; and b) the end of bipolarity after the Cold War, with the strengthening of new global “spheres of authority” made up by markets, multilateral entities, international organizations and new forms of global networks. There are also lines of continuity where one of the most relevant is the maintenance of the nation-state as a central pillar of the system. Yet, this “continuity” is increasingly eroding, leading to a dilemma which is one of our central tenets: at the same time that the position of nation-states seems to be loosing strength, there is also a growing request for states to take action and solve problems. The hypothesis discussed in this article is that such “dilemma” requires a re-thinking about “state” and “nation” in relation to the new geography of international relations. As we see it globalization is forcing all nations to redefine themselves and their state-organizations. Still, the challenge is different for each institutional environment. Albeit current systemic changes might carry a strong homogenizing force, there is also a strong heterogeneity in the way in which different cultures cope with changes. We chose here to analyze this transformation from an always conceptually difficult “Latin American” perspective.

The article begins with a general discussion around what we see as “systemic changes”, which is the macro level in which we set the Latin American context. This part contains a deeper discussion around the concept “globalization”, analyzing some of the main features of the transformations since the end of the Cold War. Focusing on the issue of
“steering states in a globalizing world”, we discuss how the traditional way of conceiving “state” and “nation” (domain, composition or even raison d’être) is changing, and the implication this has in the very form of exerting “power”. The following section focus on Latin America, where we analyze from a historical point of view, the way in which the role of state and nation has been seen in relation to the international system. There are here many points of departure; however we choose to begin with the ideas originated and spread by the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL). Our argumentis that CEPAL, and the ideas around it, such as Developmentalism (Desarrollismo), had a pivotal impact in the analysis of the state and its link to nationhood. As we see it, the currents of thinking (and action) inspired by CEPAL blended not only development theories and nationalism, but also a new kind supranational identity by institutionalizing the use of the concept “Latinoamerica” as a substantive. Although the Developmentalism lost influence during the polarization of the 1960s and the neo-liberal predominance since the 1970s, it is reappearing after the debacle of the Washington Consensus, in the aftermath of the Argentinean 2001 crisis. We analyze this evolution through a section called “the neo-liberal interlude” and in the following part where we center our attention on reflections around a “post neo-liberal” perspective. A central issue here is to explore the return of certain elements of the Developmentalist period, but opening up a discussion around what they mean in the context of Globalization. This form of dividing periods is, of course, an arbitrary act, motivated by our intention to emphasize the lines of continuity and change between the original Cepalian ideas, and current thinking about state and nationhood in Latin America. It is of course impossible to deal with the complexity of such issues in this short article. Our aim is therefore restricted to pointing out some questions from which undertake further research.

II. STEERING STATES IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD

There were many skeptics who questioned the use of the globalization concept when it became a common buzzword, during the 1990s (e.g. Hirst and Thomson, 1997). There is nevertheless growing evidence about deep changes both at the macro and micro levels. We share the view of Strange (1998:21), who concluded that “globalization is real”. A problem is that there are different ways of interpreting what it means since “the emergent order is rooted in contradictions and ambiguities” (Rosenau, 2003:209). For Strange (1998 and 1999) the changes are shown by a retreat of the state in what she calls the “Westfailure system”, that is, the increasing failure of states to satisfy the long-term conditions of
sustainability of the economic system. Since 1648, the euro-centric Westphalian system has been at the base of the structure of the international system. In such a system, as Strange points out, the prime political authority was conceded to states. These were granted the monopoly of legitimate use of force within their respective territorial borders and the notion of sovereignty rested on the principle of non-intervention. But that system was not only about structuring relations between states, it was “inseparable from the market economy which the states of (mainly Western) Europe, from the mid-17th onwards, both nurtured and promoted” (Strange, 1999:345). In other words, the notion of the nation-state is linked to the capitalist system. Yet, we believe with Strange that Globalization is pushing for deep transformations in that link, with implications in the traditional (Westphalian) view around “sovereignty”. National states can no longer draw fiscal resources from their national boundaries as before, nor act as agents “of economic and social redistribution, operating welfare systems that gave shelter to the old, the sick, the jobless and the disabled”. Thus, part of the “Westfailure” lies in the fact that the national state is losing control over its own borders. As it is further explained in Sassens’ (2005:535) work, albeit national territories may remain demarcated along the same geographic borderlines, novel types of bordering resulting from Globalization are increasingly present inside national territory: “sovereignty remains as a systemic property, yet its institutional insertion and its capacity to legitimate and absorb all legitimating powers have become unstable”.

Apart from the differences in interpretation about causes and consequences of the erosion of the Westphalian system, there is a growing perception in that problems (be it pandemics, terrorism, criminality, poverty, environment, natural disasters, financial crisis) increasingly have a trans-national dimension and cannot be solved without increasing coordination among national states. But to use the word “coordination” is perhaps too soft. The point that we want to discuss here is that that a challenging issue for states adaptation to the global system is not about if, but of the degree of supranationality that is required in order to solve (increasingly) common problems. The very use of the term “transnational” shows that national states are still important, but that these cannot be understood as the sole or even most important bodies that make up the world (Jacobsson & Sahlin-Andersson, 2006:25). As Cardoso (2004:8) have explained, Governments used to come together and discuss a new issue until there was a sufficient consensus, which then led to action by Governments and intergovernmental organizations. But today, “it is increasingly likely that a civil society movement and a crescendo of public
opinion will bring a new issue to global attention and that initial action on new issues will be taken through multi-constituency coalitions of Governments, civil society and others”. From a more economic point of view, one can also argue, as Robinson (2002:1061) does, that “national states have progressively lost the ability to capture and redirect surpluses through mechanisms that were viable in the nation-state phase of capitalism”. In few words, new institutional solutions are required.

We go along with the belief in that underscores the way to find these solutions is to transcend old national state borders and create functional forms of governance at global, regional or other levels. To do so, one has to escape traditional notions of nation-state centrism to search for a worldview which recognizes that there is now a complex multi-centric world creating structures, processes, and rules of its own. Some scholars speak of “Empire” (Negri and Hardt, 2001) or “World-culture” (Boli and Thomas, 1999), sharing the idea that “hegemonies” are no longer made up by single nation-states. Notwithstanding that the concept of hegemony may be seen as “sterile” because it has been so loosely defined (Amin, 2003:3), there are increasingly more studies pointing out the strengthening of global (non-national) sources of rule making. That is, trans-nationally organized sources of authority and legitimacy where states can be involved, through an increasingly growing number of international governmental and non-governmental organizations (Brunsson and Jacobsson, 2000:62). Nevertheless, there are problems with the emergence of such a decentralized system since, when traditional (national) sources of legitimacy are being eroded. More and more people ask the questions “who governs and who can we trust”.

The construction of post-Westphalian states is not only an issue of co-ordination, global networks or financial resources: it is also about legitimacy. Up to now, “nationalism” has been one of the most powerful generators of social cohesion and legitimacy behind a “national state” through the nation-state. An organizational form that, as said before, has been a basic point of organization for structuring markets and for the organization of the emerging capitalist system as a whole. It was not a coincidence that Smith’s (1986) seminal work was titled “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations”. While the “state” carried the ultimate administrative and organizational responsibility, “nationalism” held the ideal which made people believe in a superior instance that would guarantee different goals. An often forgotten lesson from history is that there is no point in proclaiming a “perfect” economic policy or having a state apparatus with the most “brilliant” experts, if those to be governed do not believe in it. This leads us back to the dilemma pointed out above: if the
state has to be reconfigured on a larger scale, to solve problems which national states cannot solve, what then will substitute the traditional notions of nationalism that have legitimized (and still do) the current nation-states? Particularly, when meta-national forms of nationalism clash (or are not accepted) by those that (for different reasons) still adhere to the traditional nation-states. The fact is that the international system, today, is still centered on the nation-state. Moreover, there is still no global state and neither private companies nor the so-called “global civil society” that can provide adequate governance without government (Etzioni, 2004, 352). Nonetheless, states have to solve problems and they try to find ways which, as we see it, intentionally or unintentionally leads towards the construction of common structures of governance. Let us now turn to a closer analysis on this issue from a Latin American point of view, or, vice versa, asking whether this issue can be seen from a Latin American point of view.

III. STATE AND NATION IN LATIN AMERICA

Any attempt to find generalizations always results in a flaw in the diversity which exists at the units which are part of that generalization. Generalizations are also constructions of the subjective aims, of the questions, which are behind them. With this caveat in mind, we still pursue the attempt of a “Latin American” perspective, since we find that this idea (and its different ramifications) could still be of help for the re-construction of state and nationhood in a globalizing world. But we are not inventing anything. Since the mid- 19th century, scholars have been exploring around this issue. Many of these perspectives can be found in Zea’s (1993) three volumes about the sources of Latin American culture, or in his search for a Latin American Philosophy (Zea, 1978). As Spink (1997) explains, there is also a history of the state (as administration) in Latin America, whose genesis can be traced back to Iberian or French institutions (such as the Napoleonic code).

For this study, we choose as point of departure the wave of thinking that emerged in Latin America, with the creation of CEPAL in 1948. To start with, CEPAL implied the first international institutional recognition of a “Latinoamerican” identity through its focus on “Latin America” as a unit of analysis, something that was not obvious at that time (Ardao, 1986). Second, it inserted the concept of “Development” in the Latin American lexicon, acknowledging the existence of global structural asymmetries, and a common goal for all the countries of the region. Third, CEPAL had also an unprecedented influence in the rationalization and diffusion of policy ideas across the whole region, with an increasingly protagonist role of social scientists, administrators and different kind of research
organizations. Fourth it meant an unprecedented linkage to global trends of thinking and a new kind of pervasiveness and spread of International Governmental Organizations (IGOs), under the aegis of the United Nations. CEPAL was one of the most outstanding examples of that, as part of the creation of UN-economic commissions in different parts of the World.⁶

One of the most important products stemming from CEPAL was the package of theories that went under the name Structuralism, which contained a “non-reductionist” perspective that rejected a mechanic view about economy and state. Structuralism took into account the complexities of social structures, including elements such as class and culture, where the work of Celso Furtado was of pivotal importance⁷. Yet, more important for our perspective, is that it acquired the form of a “local ideology of Development” (with capital “D”) through the Developmentalism. This current of thinking blended Structuralism, Development theories, Keynesianism⁸, Social Democratic thinking and something of particular importance in relation to state and nationhood: Nationalism (more of this in next part). As Bresser-Pereira advocate⁹ Developmentalism (Desenvolvimentismo in Portuguese) was much more than an economic theory, it was a “national development strategy”: the name of national strategies through which “dependent” countries intended to promote industrialization. We want to highlight this point, since we share the view that the nationalistic component in such strategies became the ideology of the process of formation of nation-states, which included the affirmation that, to develop, countries needed to define policies and institutions according to their own national strategies. From now on we will therefore refer to Developmentalism, as the broader frame through which we analyze the issue of “state” and “nation” as well as the link between micro and macro levels (national, regional and global).

A reason for going back to the heydays of Cepalian thinking (the 1950’s and 1960’s), is that we find it difficult to understand the process of change in ideas around the role of the state, without analyzing what Oszlak (1999:2) called the “prehistory of reform”. That is, the process that precede what are known as “first” and “second” generation reforms that took place since the 1970s. From our perspective, it is however doubtful if the concept “prehistory” is an accurate one, since the “Cepalian wave” could actually be seen as the first regionally organized impulse for general reform of Latin American states. Moreover, the idea of going back in time is not only related to the understanding of processes. As Peter Katzenstein holds, rethinking the past in light of the present and conversely, rethinking the present in light of the past are productive ways of searching for important and intriguing questions (in Kohli et. al., 1996:7). That is particularly true
when it comes to studies about the state where there has been a tendency towards “amnesia about the conditions in which major reforms were effectively implanted …” (Spink, 1997:22). We believe that the study of the ideas and answers of the developmentalist current are of great value to delve around the “intriguing questions” from the current context, which share many of the features that were already present during those days. That gives, in our opinion an impressing actuality to the observations and questions asked by that generation of intellectuals and policy-makers.

IV. DEVELOPMENTALISM

The Developmentalism was influenced by the worldwide diffusion of Keynesian ideas. A common element was the rejection of the minimalist government role and the encouragement of active involvement in the economy. In this way, “Keynesianism provided a new theoretical justification for developing countries to pursue policies that were fundamentally different from those of the industrialized world” (Babb, 2001:7-8). The Keynesian reservation concerning the market’s ability to achieve optimal results as well as its emphasis on domestic economic prosperity was used to legitimize economic planning and the support for national industrialization strategies in countries of the periphery (Shapiro & Taylor, 1990). In stressing the importance of “planning”, Keynesianism and Developmentalism had in common a strong rational and scientific bias that gave a predominant role to technocrats (experts, professionals, specialized bureaucrats). They placed a high premium on technical improvements and skills, inherent to planning and evaluation methods, in order to permit more sophisticated forms of state direction of the economy (Sikkink, 1991). Hence, (besides its emphasis on economic and social studies) Developmentalism gave a new role for science in the administration and technocrats became increasingly influential in the policy-process of many Latin American countries. That was an important difference to the so-called “Money doctors” that assisted states in Latin America before the war (Drake, 1989; Centeno and Silva, 1998). Another difference from the pre-war period was the more organized pervasiveness of new kind of International Organizations. As far as we know, there had never been anything as universal and comprehensive as the IOs linked to the UN-system, which appeared after 1945. In sum, the link to Keynesianism, together with the global spread of UN-organizations, worked as a strong force to give more attention to the role of the state.

During the 1950s and 1960s the term used for analysis about the state apparatus was “Administrative Reform”, with an emphasis on planning for “national development”. Inspired by European (mainly French but also
Soviet) models of planning, it was argued that the Latin American states had to be re-constructed (or in some cases, constructed) in order to be capable of dealing with the new technical models. It required, as Furtado (1985) argued, the collection and homogenization of economic and social data that (in many cases) never had been done before. Thanks to CEPAL’s elaboration of data and its work for the training of technocrats from different countries, nation-states started to “see themselves” and compare their situation with other countries, something crucial for any serious efforts of integration. All this was a condition for long-term thinking and the initiative was (to a large extent) left to the state since it was generally considered that the private sector lacked will, resources and organization to do so. One of the most emblematic examples of this model of thinking was the Chilean Corporación Para el Fomento y la Producción (CORFO), through which the state intended to show the capability in devising the necessary linkages between enclave sectors (such as mining) and the rest of the economy. This “devising” was directly linked to the rapidly expanding stratum of “technical-political specialists”, competing for the top political and technical-administrative positions within the state-apparatus. CORFO was largely dominated by technocrats (mainly engineers) who concentrated most of the policy-making power within the organization. These technocrats did not only have the last say about how resources were allocated to the industrial sector, but also seemed to have provided the “industrializing ethos” that the private sector was unable to articulate itself (Cavarozzi, 1975:55-50). Albeit organizations such as CORFO, where more of an exception in Latin America (as also Chile was), the idea of “reform” and “rationalization” of the administration, became widely diffused although it found many fronts of resistance. The efforts towards industrialization, planning or rationalization gave (or intended to give) the state a protagonistic role, particularly as articulator of the interest of distinct “fractions of capital” and society. Medina Echavarria pictured such fractions as a “tripod” composed by transnational companies, the big national companies and those from the public sector. Thus, Development was seen as dependent on the way in which the state could act as a node that could combine such interest in order to conduct socio-economic changes.

The issue of “how” or “whether” the state was going to become such a “node” was one of the main lines of discussion that deeply divided societies. That division was pervaded by deep ideological cleavages, polarized by the Cuban revolution in 1959 and later on by the neo-liberal wave that became increasingly dominant throughout the 1970s. Most
Developmentalists policy-makers (and scholars) were though aligned around what we would call, “UN or Cepalian-thinking”, linked it in turn to “nationalism”. Along that line, and differently to anti-systemic development ideas, Developmentalism did not share the vision about an absolute domination of the state over the productive system. It did not either have an antagonistic position towards the global market economy. Notwithstanding strong criticism and alternative thinking regarding integration to the “asymmetric” world capitalist system, it sought paths of integration. Some basic analytical guidelines on the “hows” were formulated by scholars such as Medina Echavarría (1970:241-242), who conceived development strategies through a “triple process of change” which implied: a) an analysis of how to adapt to the international markets, b) the ways to achieve “national integration”, c) taking into account that the process of transformation is linked to a process of “supranational integration”.

Notwithstanding brilliant scholars and (not to underestimate) the legitimacy of “UN thinking”, the first wave of state reform and nation-building around Development oriented ideals did (generally) fail. There is still much research to be done in around the reasons for such failure. In our opinion there are very much endogenous answers, with evident failures in all three elements mentioned by Medina Echavarría. Yet, it is difficult to estimate the extent of these, since there were also exogenous elements imposed (fundamentally) by the Cold War. We argue that one of the Developmentalism’s first tragic victims was the Guatemalan reform process, which ended with a US-supported coup in 1954 (before the Cuban revolution). The Developmentalism’s blend of Nationalism, Development and state found strong resistance from “Marxists”, “neo-liberals”, but also (as the case of Guatemala showed) in particular interests expressed in the Foreign Policy of the United States. It should also be said that not all Developmentalism shared the “UN-thinking” and it’s strong “democratic” bias. There was a current, that Garretón et. al. (2005:559) calls “conservative Developmentalism” (perhaps “authoritarian Developmentalism” is a more accurate term), fundamentally made up of policy-makers that ended up working with military regimes. Although many of these people shared the structuralist perspective they became frustrated with the difficulties of achieving a national consensus through democratic means. Particularly in relation to the “failure” in containing the growing strength of anti-systemic forces inspired by the Cuban model. Development, as a central component of a “national ideology”, was set aside for a Cold War “Security”, perspective, that also undermined the “supranational”
component that did exist in Developmental thinking. Amidst that process, both Cepalian inspired ideas, such as “Latinamericanism”, lost influence.

V. THE NEO-LIBERAL INTERLUDE

Since the late 1970s, but particularly since the “debt crisis” of the early 1980s, we have what we here call the “neo-liberal interlude”. We could divide this period in two moments. The first is the attempt to introduce reforms through authoritarian means that covered Latin America with military regimes, which had mixed results regarding liberalizations. In fact, many of these, although adopting a more liberal rhetoric, maintained many Developmental oriented policies. One of the salient examples is Brazil that after a brief neo-liberal orientation, turned back to Developmentalist oriented policies (Cervo and Bueno, 2002). The second period, since the mid-1980s, pursued neo-liberal oriented policies increasingly through democratic means, only this time amidst globalization. Let’s start here by pointing out that the concept of “interlude” is a bit tendentious. The reason is that (as we will try to show in the following part) we want to emphasize the elements of continuity between the Cepalian inspired Developmentalism with the current “post neo-liberal” context, when both “neo-liberal” as well as pro-Cuban models lost their former legitimacy.

Regarding the state, the neo-liberal “reforms” pushed agendas that included privatizations and constantly preached for a reduction of the state to a minimum. Since CEPAL’s early push for reform of the state, as Spink (1997:8) tells, the term “Administrative Reform” has been sub-divided and stretched so that the resultant space includes specific administrative procedures: civil service reform, capacity building and major constitutional reforms of the state. One of the most influential packages of ideas appeared under the label “New Public Management”. The essence of this model was the search for a leaner and smaller, but prepared, government (Rockman, 2003:46). But the result was often, and especially in countries undergoing structural adjustment, a restricted view of public administration reform where terms such as “downsizing” or “rolling back the state” were introduced. In Latin America, these ideas became largely associated to the “Washington Consensus” guidelines (Williamson, 1993) and international organizations such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The influence of these international organizations gained unprecedented proportions after the debt problem of the 1980s, and states were pushed to set the Reform issue in their agendas. An effect has been “a gradual narrowing of the reform theme and of narratives that surround public administration actions, towards a remarkable homogeneous 1990’s”
But the proposed (or imposed) neo-liberal alternatives never delivered the promised results, and the neo-liberal predominance was definitely broken after the Argentinean meltdown in year 2001.

In line with the perspective of this article, we would argue that one of the main failures of the neo-liberal governments was the achievement of long-lasting national coalitions behind their strategies. During 1970s and 1980s, the efforts to break-up with the “Developmental State” and what under the cold-war parameters was seen as “subversive elements”, lead to the installation of authoritarian regimes. These undertook policies of massive repression and a brutality which turned major parts of the populations against them. On top of that, many of them left behind disastrous economic results after the “debt crisis”, during the 1980s. The continuity and deepening of neo-liberal policies through democratic governments did also left poor results behind. By the late 1990s, most of the countries were facing increasing levels of income inequality, alarming levels of poverty and social exclusion. Speaking about both periods, one could say that the “war against communism”, extended later on to be a “war against the state” and everything that implied state-led initiatives for income distribution, did basically fail in becoming a “national ideology”.

Going back to Medina Echavarría’s three elements, we argue that although neo-liberals might have presented reasonable strategies on how to adapt to international markets, they failed to achieve “national integration”.

There is though a caveat in treating the “neo-liberal” current in terms of black and white. As we see it, for the case of Latin America, there appears to be a paradox. Notwithstanding the “anti-state” bias of that period, there was also a broad focus around “Reform of the State” as a wide process of reflection on state and society. In Spink’s (1997:2) words, by “including the widespread attempts at decentralization and the enactment of municipal legislation it has broadened to reflect over the institutions in society as a whole”. This indicates a reflection that was made in close linkage to global ideas through an increasing local pervasiveness of multilateral banks (e.g. World Bank). Added to their traditional lending role these organizations gained unprecedented influence in relation to technical assistance programs in the area of Modernization of the State or in programs towards Civil Society. But these were not alone; much of their activity was more and more scrutinized and influenced by a plethora of emerging international organizations that focused their work on the protection of social rights. As it is showed by Lembke (2006:120) in an analysis of indigenous peasant movements in Guatemala and Ecuador, while neo-liberal reforms and most legal documents favored the property rights of the agrarian oligarchs, there were also legal loopholes that could
be exploited to the advantage of the peons, especially as they could draw support from international conventions. In spite of the negative view of the state, it could be said that neo-liberalism also served to draw attention to the defense on “individual rights” as well as in more “efficient” states, with the mindset on insertion in the global system. However, taking into account the current systemic challenges outlined above, the question is whether the traditional national state dimension is the most “efficient” to successfully insert Latin American countries in the new global system. In this sense, we believe that neo-liberalism did also fail in following Medina Etchavarrías third guideline: that of “supranational integration”. Free trade agreements do not seem to be enough.

VI. A Post Neo-Liberal Perspective

Nowadays, with the impact of Globalization and the patterns of the wave of crises of the late 1990s, it is increasingly understood that freeing markets does also require competent and strong state organizations that can impose regulation, at national, regional or global levels. Using the words of Bresser-Pereira (2002:116), in the early years of the new century, “times of small government are over”. There is an increasing need for states that are capable of confronting the increasing demands of the population, which needs “shelter” against the effect of crisis and the negative impact of reforms. That situation, as noted by Bresser-Pereira (1998:522-533), leads to a kind of “double pressure” on the state since Globalization, on the one hand represents a challenge in relation to how to protect its citizens, while, on the other, demands that the state becomes stronger, cheaper, and more efficient in order to alleviate costs for the companies that compete internationally. The question around how to solve this “double pressure” is asked by both rich and poor countries, since “crisis” (economic and social) is a feature of the whole system, even of the “welfare states” of the core. Yet, even if all are under strain, the capacity to confront problems is unequal. Structuralism is still right in that there is a “core” and “periphery” division in the world. Although these concepts are not fashionable today, one can see that there is a constant reference to “north”/“south”, “developing”/“developed” or industrialized/non-industrialized countries, showing that there is a split in the system. As Prebisch thought, “underdevelopment” cannot be identified only with simple backwardness, but as part of a structural pattern that needs its own theoretical explanation (Rodriguez, 2001:46). The focus around how to restructure states for integration to Globalism should not be separated from this point. This does not mean that “core” and “periphery” are static concepts. Much have happened in the more than fifty years since Prebisch presented his first
ideas, and there appears to be an increasing dynamism and diversity both between and within each dimension. In the aftermath of the Argentinean 2001 crisis, there is a new attention to positions searching for new strategies of development. Some speak of the need of a model based on a “new consensus”, rejecting “market fundamentalism” and seeing the strengthening and quality of institutions as indispensable for development (Rodrik, 2005). Other speaks of “Dynamic Equilibrium” (Jaguaribe, 2006), advocating fiscal and inflationary discipline, but with active policies (e.g. low interest rates) to reduce asymmetries. With roots back in the early 1990s, we also find efforts to re-define concepts which are close to the structuralist line of thinking. One example is the “neo-structural” approach, which remarks the importance of exports, innovation as well as about overcoming the “false dilemma” of putting off agricultural development. With scholars such as Fernando Fajnzylberg, neo-structuralism search for a theoretical re-actualization by emphasizing the role of technological progress and of the entrepreneur in the Development process. Along this view, the state, as the node of “productive articulation”, is given a strategic role. Rejecting the neo-liberal approach for “reductionist” and stressing the importance of a “concerting state”, neo-structuralists argued that the state’s central function is to devise a strategic vision of Development (macroeconomic balances, an appropriate investment) “by means of dialogue and concertation” (Salazar-Sirinachs, 1993:388). Along this line, we have the approach presented by Bresser-Pereira (see his article in this issue of Iberoamericana) where he speaks of New Developmentalism (Novo Desenvolvimentismo). An advantage of the “New Developmentalism” (beyond Structuralism) is that it stresses the need of a “national ideology” as the base of a “basic national contract” (acordo nacional). Indeed, a basic question regarding the reform of the state is to what extent the apparatus can gain ‘developmental efficiency’, without an encompassing ‘national ideology of development’. We get here closer to our core argument, pointing out that although neo-structuralists and new developmentalists share an interest in “bringing back” the state, there is still scarce knowledge about how such state should be constructed in order to meet the new global challenges.

Already in the mid-1980s a group of leading scholars got together in a publication with the title of “Bringing the State Back In” (Evans et. al., 1999). These scholars rejected the view, which only saw states as controlled by economic interest groups that transformed the State into an “inefficient” arena. In a time when many spoke of neo-liberal hegemony, this group of authors saw that, in the words of Skocpol (1999:7) “a paradigmatic shift seems to be underway in the macroscopic social
sciences, a shift that involves a fundamental re-thinking of the role of states in relation to economy and society”. With Globalization, the issue of re-thinking the state is perhaps more urgent than ever but also different to what they envisaged during the mid-1980s. It is by now, quite evident that markets cannot by themselves solve issues related to income distribution. They cannot either create mechanisms to protect people against the new kind of “global” problems that we mentioned above. But it is also increasingly evident that national states cannot either confront such problems by themselves. That is particularly true when it comes to periphery states, which are in urgent need to create local synergies to confront both the increasing costs of Development, and the need of a stronger presence in global spheres of authority. The later, as we see it, is of absolute priority if the international agenda setting will reflect periphery interests. Yet, the dilemma mentioned before is also visible in Latin America. That is, although states need to “transnationalize” to attend public demands. The national ideologies inherent in the present nation-state constellation are blocking the process.

With this in mind, we would say that a shortcoming of New Developmentalism is that it equals Globalization with neo-liberalism, missing that (as we tried to show above) Globalization also implies a new set of systemic patterns beyond markets, with deep significance for a renewed analysis of states and their relation to nationhood. Sticking to the Old Developmentalism’s national perspective (restricted to traditional nation-state nationalism), could risk the future re-dimensioning of a more “efficient” Developmental State. With Medina Etchavarrí’s third element in mind, it would be fruitful to look further at the lessons from the European process, where regionalization can only work if there is some level of supranationality. But if such supranationality will be long-standing, a “national (supranational) ideology” must be constructed. People must believe in the new institution in order to lose their fears and reach a supranational idea of solidarity. We try to sketch out this problem in figure 1, where we point out that for successful D (development) strategies; R (regionalism) is needed. But we will not obtain R, without some level of S (supranationality), something that in turn also difficult D.

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Figure 1
Creating a supranational “national ideology” or, as Ardao (1986) explains, the idea of a “nation of nations” is certainly a long-term task; and one of the underlying difficulties for the deepening of regionalization processes in Latin America (and Europe). We refer to the consciousness and trust, leading local individuals and organizations to believe that abstaining from their own maximizing, in favor of supranational “common good”, is in their own interest. Along this line, we go back to the question of whether there is a point in emphasizing the issue of “Latin America”. One of CEPAL’s most important long-term achievements was bring up the concept, and to give it a new content, not (necessarily) related to the opposition towards the US, but to the regions “underdeveloped” position in the world system. The creation of CEPAL in 1948 was not only the beginning of understanding Latin American Development. It implied a synthesis between CEPAL’s theoretical package, with a century-long process in the path towards an international recognition of the substantiation of “Latinoamerica”. That is, the path towards a supranational identity of a “culture of cultures” (Zea & Magallón, 1999). As advocated by Jaguaribe (1970:320), it was a novelty to consider Latin America as a unit and that “Latin American intelligentsia became conscious of the fact that Latin America, more than a situation, is a condition [my italics] based in the underdevelopment and colonialism that characterize men and nations of the area in question”. Developmentalism picked up much of this thread, intertwining it with national institutions, creating a package that in many cases gained a strong “ideological force”. However, in spite of it’s regional vocation, “latinoamericanism” never really pervaded national polices, leading to rather inward looking policies. The “latinoamerican” spirit was perhaps strong in opposition to the United States, but it never gained enough strength to overcome “localism”, in favor of supranational “developmental state structures”. Also neo-liberalism failed here since it emphasizes “market liberalization”, but are skeptic about the state at all levels (national, regional or global).

Looking at the issue today, and thinking in terms of sub-regional processes such as NAFTA or MERCOSUR, it is an open discussion as to what extent “Latin America” is the most appropriate concept. Nonetheless, it seems difficult to solve the current problems in each constellation without institutional deepening and a broader regional outlook. In both cases, we see a problem in maintaining cohesion due to the big asymmetries among countries. In the case of NAFTA that can be seen, for example, through the limitations in labor mobility. Will it ever be possible to stop illegal migrations without some kind of regional “structural funds” (like those of the EU), and would that be possible without taking into
account Mexico’s southern neighbors? For the case for the MERCOSUR countries, where keeping together in international negotiations and a common development agenda is of great importance, cohesion is also seriously threatened by asymmetries. The recent environmental conflict between Argentina and Uruguay can be regarded as a reminder of the need for supranational establishments that gives institutional guaranties to the smaller members. Still, from a long-term perspective such “guaranties” are not only an issue of small vs. big countries, but a prerequisite to pursue further monetary and political integration. Our concern here is based in the belief that, with the patterns of the globalization process, a development policy that is only confined within the traditional national frames seems to be doomed. In this respect, we hold that deepened Regionalism could be seen as a way of “steering through globalization”. There is, in this respect, much to learn through comparative studies where we see the European Union (EU) as a paradigmatic case in relation to new forms of governance.20 Through studies of the “new regionalisms” (Hettne et. al., 1999 and 2001) that emerged during the 1990s, scholars observed that one of their characteristics is that they assume “actorhood” (increasingly acting as block in international arenas) as a way of coping with globalization. This implies the need to search for their own supranational identity, which also means finding their own (supranational) sources of legitimacy. One example is “intra-regionalism”, where the EU tries to become “the hub of a large number of interregional arrangements which, in turn, are strengthening its own regionalist ideology” (Söderbaum & Langenhove, 2005:251). Nevertheless, as for the case of Globalism, (national) state-centric interests also hinder the construction of Regionalism. The EU, for example, has found it increasingly difficult to achieve goals using only traditional methods of rule making. It has therefore pioneered new forms of governance, where the EU “instead of traditional modes of rule making, used what could be seen as self-regulation” (Jacobsson & Sahlin-Anderson, 2006:16). This type of regulation, also known as soft regulations (or rules), has made it easier to lead different forces towards policy convergence. “Soft regulations” stand in contrast to traditional regulations dependent on an authoritative centre which produces rules and directives that others must follow. Compliance of “soft regulations” are, instead, defined together with the rules themselves since “authority” is not pre-defined in the relationships between those regulated and those regulating (Jacobsson & Sahlin-Anderson, 2006:2-3)21. Our hypothesis is that this way of exerting power is also on the rise in Latin America, and there is much “integration” going on under the surface. It may be that, in spite of all setbacks of integration processes, the systemic changes are pushing the region closer towards
Jaguaribe’s (1970:327-328) vision in that: “the broad development of the Latin American countries could only happen in a more advance historical moment, when the system of nation-states has been overcome and that either Latin American integration; a Western Hemispheric empire; or a Global State, has been organized”. We are closer to that moment, at least regarding the path of changes in traditional patterns of nation-states. But systemic changes are usually not enough, and there is much thinking to do along Medina Etchavarría’s three elements. Summing up, we hold that the world system is growing away from the “Double Edge” (national-international) perspective described in Evans et. al. (1993). It goes towards multilevel structures that promote the creation of new inter-sectoral contact points within and among state units. Such units will not either necessarily operate on orders from the “top levels” of governments, since their efficiency will increasingly depend on networks, where traditional hierarchies are not likely to be effective (Keohane & Nye, 2002:204). For the case of Latin America, it’s no doubt that Globalization introduces new elements from which to rethink Development, as a “synthesis” of State and Nation.

VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The main task of this paper is to contribute in the analysis of “state” and “nation”, in the context of the Globalization process. This line of thinking leads us to ask questions such as: what is the most appropriate level of nationhood in order to have an efficient “Developmental State”? or, to what extent is it possible to achieve an “efficient” state, without an “ideology of development” that considers the new patterns of nationhood? We see a flaw in current studies about the state in Latin America, where reform histories are often provided in an “a-historical form”. In an attempt to overcome that problem, this study has sought to revisit earlier ideas about “modernization” of Latin American states. Our point is that the currents of ideas created around what we have called the Cepalian thinking, advanced many of the responses as well as the questions that still are of importance. Contrary to ideas that predominated in the “neo-liberal interlude”, there is today continuity in the search for an integrated view of economy and society and in the vision of the state as a concerting and articulating agent. Indeed, the view of the state (“big or small”, “owner or promoter” “entrepreneur or node of networks”) as a developmental agent is one of the most important heritages from the “original structuralism”. It is also around this variable (the state), that current research is increasingly attributing the success of periphery countries in East Asian countries, where it is even argued that “Prebisch lives in Asia” (Amsden, 2004).
However, a second element raised here, is that the progress of developmental strategies to a large extent depended on the successful mixture with a national ideology that is coupled to a “national consensus”. In that respect we have advocated for the advantages in looking back to Developmentalism, a movement that blended nationalism and development into a local ideological expressions.

Taking into account the challenges of Globalization and the insufficiency of traditional national structures (both state and sub-national groupings) to cope with it, a third point is around the need to re-define the most efficient level of state formation. We believe that it is becoming more evident that supranational state entities are required. However, if these will have legitimacy and credibility, the “national-ideology” has to be broadened to the new level, be it global, regional or even bi-lateral. That implies discussing the need for new notions of “nationhood”, that goes beyond traditional nation-state borders. Although many of the old Cepalian postulate about “national planning” or giving the state an “entrepreneurial” role have lost ground, their view about a “single world” and the need to find a “Latin American” path of “integration to the system” are still relevant. Along this line, there is an enormous value in analytical tools to conceive development strategies along Medina Echavarría’s “triple process of change”, that was ahead of its time stressing the need for supranationalism for a successful regional integration to the world. These issues have certainly a different meaning now than when he asked them, but they have great actuality for analyzing current paths of systemic integration. Yet, no analysis of “integration to the world” should forget that there still is a structural “duality”. Although the EU might be an interesting “road map” for Latin American integration, we should have in mind that although the “road” might be similar, the “map” is very different. When the European Community began, all those countries were already industrialized and exerted a great influence over international trade, which allowed them to protect vulnerable economic sectors as well as vulnerable social groups. This helped them to maintain political stability. The Latin American countries have to do all that at the same time, and with democratic institutions. The task is indeed formidable.
Notes

1 The acronym in English is ECLAC. Since the Commission is more known by its Spanish acronym, CEPAL, this will be used throughout the article.

2 We use these words in Spanish, since they have different meaning than those in English. The most thorough discussion about the Latin dimension of the American identity towards a “latinoamericanization” of the concept, along hispanoamerican, iberoamerican or pan-american identities is found in Ardao 1986.


4 After around three decades of war, an exhausted Europe signed a peace treaty in October 1648. A peace conference was held in the Westphalian towns of Munster and Osnabruck.

5 Samir Amin advocates that “the hegemony of the United States, seemingly unchallenged today, perhaps by default, is as fragile and precarious as the Globalization of the structures through which it operates” (2003:3).

6 The first one, was the UN-Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), lead by Gunnar Myrdal, which also stressed the idea of “planning” to rebuild the (by that time) devastated and divided European continent (see Myrdal, 1968). The UNECE was created in 1947, one year before CEPAL, and it still exists today. For more information see: http://www.unece.org/Welcome.html 2005-12-20.

7 For a thorough review on Furtados’ work see Rodriguez 2006. Another interesting (and shorter) view can be found in Bielschowsky (2006).

8 For an interesting analysis of the “Keynesianizing” of governmental polices, read work edited by Hall (1989).

9 See his article in this issue of Iberoamericana.

10 In Spanish, técnicos.

11 That view can be questioned since there are indications of enthusiasm and support from important sectors of national empresarios (entrepreneurs) (see Rivarola (2003) for Chile and Uruguay, or Bielschowsky (2000) for Brazil).

12 CORFO was created in 1938, but was transformed into a key “developmental” agency during the government of the Christian Democrat candidate Eduardo Frei Montalva (1964-70). Other examples were the Brazilian Superintendencia para el Desarrollo del Nordeste (SUDENE) lead by Celso Furtado (see Furtado, 1989) or the Uruguayan Comisión de Inversiones y Desarrollo Económico (CIDE) lead by Enrique Iglesias (see Garcé, 2002).

13 Chile has, in many ways, always been an exception. It had an unique (for Spanish America) transition towards independence, and it was the “model” both under Desarrollismo, Neoliberalism or the more current so-called, “progressive” lines of thinking.

14 A good overview about this can be found in Rodriguez (2006:175).

15 This is a generalization since not all “Marxist” were aligned the “left-wing” (Pro-Cuban Model) criticism on both CEPAL I and the Developmentalism. For an interesting perspective on this debate, and a mea culpa, see Gunder Frank (2003).

16 For example the Brazilian Roberto Campos (Planning Minister of the Castello Branco regime in 1964), the Chilean Raúl Saez (president of CORFO during the Eduardo Frei administration and, Minister of Economic Co-ordination in 1974, during the Military regime), or Alejandro Vegh Villegas (Finance Minister of the Military regime between 1974-1976).
Shils’ (1988 and 1975) perspective could be of great value here since it does not regard power as a one-way-street from center to periphery, but as a kind of dialectical interaction where emerging “countercenters” design the periphery’s desire to penetrate the sphere of authority dominated by the center.

That is, becoming a “Developmental State”. For Evans (1995:12) developmental states are those that; “not only preside industrial transformation but also have played a role in making it happen”. They are composed by a highly selective meritocratic bureaucracy with long-term career rewards and sense of corporate coherence that are embedded in a set of social ties that bind the state to society (Evans, 1997, 67)

North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), Mercado Comun del Sur (MERCOSUR).

Following Jacobsson (2005:3) Governance should here be understood as including rule-making in the traditional sense – that is, the issuing of formal laws and directives – but also the production and supply of standards and recommendations as well as more discursive and meditative activities.

All this goes very much in hand with the work around networks. An insightful view on this issue can be found in Castells (1996).

That is particularly evident through the more intensive nature of economic negotiations between countries in recent years. This has meant that a much greater number of departments are now becoming involved in international negotiations than was the case before the growth in economic interdependence during the 1980s and 1990s. In 1950 there were some 70 independent countries with over 830 departments of government; the current figure is of around 180 States with well over 2500 departments (Woolcock, 2004, 45-48). This is followed with a spectacular proliferation of INGOs, from 200 active organizations in 1900, to around 4000 in the 1980s, and 60 percent of those concentrate on economic or technical rationalization (Boli & Thomas, 1999, 20-41).

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