SOCIAL AND POLITICAL LEGACIES OF EMANCIPATION OF SLAVERY IN THE AMERICAS

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The process of Emancipation of slavery in the Americas lasted almost one hundred years, from St. Domingue in 1793 to Brazil in 1988. Therefore, in this paper, to analyse the consequences, I have chosen to look at the situation in several former slave societies about a century after the event.

This is not so because of an arbitrary fixation with the figure of 100 years. In fact, I loathe centennials, incl. those of Columbus and of Swedish Delaware. It is because about one hundred years are usually taken as the equivalent of three generations. By turn, this roughly corresponds to the duration of a meaningful oral tradition in a modern society. In the case of the famous “Roots” of Alex Haley, if really representing a longer duration, let us then take it as the exception confirming the rule.

Also, if we go beyond the time span of a century after an event of such fundamental importance, would it be possible anymore to separate the impact of Emancipation from that of slavery, or that of other, possibly external events and conditions within the historical process? No clearly defined “legacy” could then be clearly discerned in the complex web of historical causation. No “counterfactual” approach with scholarly pretensions could possibly uncover today how, for instance, Barbados would have evolved without slavery or what would have happened if Emancipation had not taken place there when and in the way it did.

Although in this article I put stress on the social and political aspects of the process of Emancipation, obviously economic factors will also mightily impose themselves now and then. Even if you do not subscribe to the hoary notion of a “slavery mode of production”, nobody can possibly deny the overwhelmingly economic importance of, in particular plantation slavery in

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the country or region where it is predominant. This is why I have preferred to start my discussion by reproducing the fascinating table (see Table I) recently elaborated by Herbert Klein and Stanley Engerman on the state of sugar production in various New World slave societies 5 years before and 5 years after Emancipation. The table also shows the time period for recovery of pre-Emancipation production levels. It eloquently shows the enormous variety of the economic framework of post-Emancipation social and political developments of the former slave plantation societies. The contrast between the accelerating sugar growth of Cuba after Emancipation and the disastrous “decline” of Haiti (from the strictly export-economy point of view) could hardly be greater. The quick “recovery” of Martinique (where it took hundred years less than in Haiti) and of Brazil (15-20 years) also deserve to be noticed. What we do not see, of course are the social and political factors at play behind these export production figures.

Let us start a series of very short national accounts with St. Domingue/Haiti⁵. You always have to start there when talking about Emancipation because it also heavily influenced that of other countries. Most indications are that it mainly had a retarding effect. First, it must be underscored that the timing and form of Emancipation would not have been imaginable without the French revolution. Until 1791, slave uprisings there had been less frequent than anywhere else in the Caribbean. Another most important fact is the increase and vigor, on the eve of Emancipation, of free blacks and mulattoes. They formed in 1788 as much as 40 percent of the admittedly small free population⁶. A third relevant fact is the extremely sanguinary and destructive character of the Emancipation/Independence process. In this respect, it is roughly comparable only to the US Civil War. It should be kept in mind, however, that even after ten years of warfare, enough of the system remained, in the view of economist Mats Lundahl (1983:70), “for a restoration of la grande culture to be a feasible option”. Plantation agriculture was restored in a way that “differed from slavery in name only” until the agrarian reform of Alexandre Pétion in the Southern Republic in 1809 and a decade later in the Kingdom of the North. “By 1840, Haiti had become a nation of free peasants and this situation was to be reinforced during the rest of the nineteenth century” (ibid. 71).

The quiet change taking place then, that is after about hundred years, was fundamental, though, due to the lack of reliable data, hard to pin down for a study in depth. While population fell from about 520.000 in 1789 to 380.000 in 1805, the ensuing demographic recovery probably attained a higher rate only toward the end of the century (Perhaps, 1.1 million in 1864, 2 million in 1922: Lundahl 1979:190 f). This population growth, by turn, forms the backdrop of two basic changes in Haitian social structure. First, large scale labor emigration
to Cuba and elsewhere set in; second, the now existing scarcity of peasant land seems to have caused the pattern of intergenerational sharecropping discerned behind the prevalent notion of “peasant ownership” by Gerald F. Murray and Mats Lundahl (1983:83-93). Interestingly, the same period around 1900 was also the time when the color contents of Haiti’s neverceasing political struggle and cultural debate appear to have reached their culmination. Still as emphasized by David Nicholls (1979:141), the fight was mainly one between elites, that of blacks and mulattos respectively, as it had been ever since the days of King Henri Christophe and President Pétion7. Two final remarks: The figures of sugar production should not induce us to equal early peasant subsistence economy with “human misery”. Today’s misery is the consequence of a lengthy, gradual process. Also, even if “whites” were lacking as a group in post-Abolition Haiti, I believe the concept of “ethnicity” to be paramount as an analytical device with respect to the social development of the so-called Black Republic (Mörner 1987).

Let us now quickly pass to the next important stage in the New World Emancipation process, that is the British Caribbean (including its final apprenticeship phase) in 1838. As different from Haiti, abolition had been preceded by the cease of slave imports not so long after the legal metropolitan decision in 1807. It conditioned the Emancipation process considerably. In Barbados which in the 1830’s had for long left behind it the culmination of the sugar cycle, slave density remained high and demand low8.

In Jamaica, on the other hand, slave demand remained much higher. That is true even though Jamaica was already being bypassed, within the inexorable sugar cycle, by “new” sugar colonies such as Trinidad with its rich virgin soils. As we have already seen in the Table, consequently, in terms of economic “decline” and “recovery”, Jamaica was much more severely hit by Emancipation than Barbados. As is very well known, in the larger island what Philip D. Curtin (1955) aptly (but with some exaggeration) called the “Two Jamaicas” emerged. Two worlds would be facing each other, incompatible in culture and mentalities, that of the black peasantry and that of the survivals of Plantation society9.

In Barbados, on the other hand, the lack of job alternatives facing exslaves left Plantation society almost intact. At least, until a riot taking place in 1876, social control was easily maintained by the plantocracy. In Jamaica, not unlike Haiti, a rather large scale slave rebellion in 1831-32 had preceded and influenced Emancipation. About one generation later, the accumulated frustration of the darkskinned peasantry led to social protest and the Morant Bay massacre in 1865. By turn, the white fear for a black and mulattoe take over within the framework of the traditonal political autonomy then led to the backward step to direct Crown rule in 1866.
Admittedly, urban blacks and mulattoes had played a certain role in the Legislative Assembly but the peasants had been disfranchised in 1859 already. In Barbados, characteristically, the same backward step would not be taken until almost twenty years later.

By the 1930’s, that is hundred years after Emancipation, both Jamaica, Barbados and the remainder of the British Caribbean were caught in the maelstrom of the Depression. Labor unions and strikes mushroomed, were forcefully suppressed but recovered to give rise to parliamentary parties. Even so, as different from Jamaica, in Barbados a small white elite continued to retain the control over the economy as late as the 1970’s (Allen 1979).

The next stage in the New World process of Emancipation can be discerned around 1850, that is in the French islands of the Caribbean and, on the mainland, in countries like Colombia, Venezuela and Peru. There plantation slavery used to be quite important but never as predominant as in the Caribbean, Brazil and the United States South. It is natural to relate this stage with the final breakthrough of Liberalism, both in France and most Latin American countries. At the same time, it must be stressed that in this group of territories final abolition only took place long after the institution of slavery had been roughly shaken and lost whatever legitimacy it ever enjoyed.

In Guadeloupe slavery had been abolished by revolutionary France in 1794. Both there and in Martinique, for a time under British occupation, Bonaparte was shameless enough to reintroduce slavery in 1802. Moreover, the slave trade to French territories was revived from 1815 to 1831. What really brought about Emancipation was the pigheaded resistance of the white planter elite to any improvement of the situation of the free blacks and mulattoes, les affranchis. In Martinique their share of the total population had grown from 13 percent in 1831 to as much as 32 in 1848. Discrimination finally made the affranchis, owners of about a sixth of all slaves, finally join the latter in a demand for the abolition of slavery. The quick recovery of the sugar industry is confirmed by a glance at the Table. The pioneering use of “la usine” laid the basis for a new stage in world sugar production. Hundred years after Emancipation, Eugene Revert (1949) observed that the Martinique economy was still under the control of a tiny white elite. Politically, of course, the French device of “integrating” its colonies with metropolitan France in 1946 could hardly fool anyone as to the political impotence of the French West Indians, of whatever color.

In the Northern South American republics and in Peru, thanks to Simón Bolívar, however ambivalent he was himself on the whole issue of race, slavery lost its legitimacy in the debates producing the laws of free birth in 1821, albeit never fully implemented. On the whole, imports of slaves from outside also
ceased. More important, however, in sapping the strength of slavery as an institution and source of labor supply, was the massive use of blacks and mulattoes, whether manumitted or not, as soldiers, in the lengthy, most destructive Wars of Independence. Still, as well put by Frank Safford (1985:387), "...through the 1830's and into the 1840's, all parties prudently refrained from hastening the demise of slavery and even took steps to slow its end". Merely with the appearance of a younger, more radical generation of politicians, Emancipation materialized, at long last, in Colombia in 1850, in Ecuador in 1852, in Peru and Venezuela in 1854. It should be noticed, though, that in Peru the guano boom permitted generous compensation to former slave owners and that in Venezuela, according to John Lombardi (1971:141) "Slavery ended only when the cost of maintaining (it) was calculated to be greater than the cost of eliminating it".

In Colombia by mid-century slavery merely retained some economic importance on a regional level, that is in the Valley of Cauca. But even there, the slave percentage of the provincial population has dropped from 37.8 in 1825 to only 3.6 in 1851 (Escorcia 1983:67). As a consequence, when we take the secular perspective from the mid-twentieth century, to be true in certain regions of the republics I have mentioned, dark phenotypes and folkloristic traits of African origin quite often betray the “legacy” of black slavery. Still, it would be far from easy to discern any such “legacy” of the lengthy, complex process of Emancipation, possibly apart from some post-Emancipation flows of internal migration. They strengthened, for instance, the character of once gold rich Chocó as an especially neglected and poor part of the Colombian Republic.

When turning to the United States of the Civil War years, I have to avoid, at the same time, enumerating the facts that everybody knows, and getting involved in such scholarly debates that would require far too much space even to summarize. What is basic in our context here is, in the first place, that the selfreproduction of slaves was early in making American slaveholders independent of outside supply; second that the percentage and status of free blacks and mulattoes was always low and sinking as time went on; and, third, that the federal system allowed for a political North-South division and polarization between non-slavery and slave States which roughly reflected two different economic systems. With respect to the Civil War itself, its most striking feature in this context is that basically it was a massive killing of whites by whites with the bulk of Southern slaves merely watching the outcome.

The casualty rate had to increase very much before President Lincoln in late 1862 finally let black volunteers (many of them refugees from the South) enlist in Union armies at the same time as Emancipation was also declared an official war objective from January 1, 1863. In the wake of Union armies, the
traditional plantation order largely collapsed. It should be noticed, however, that to begin with, the legislatures of the defeated States did their best to ensure that plantation labor should be provided by the blacks also after the demise of slavery. Cotton production seems to have recovered quickly while sugar production in Louisiana (Table) suffered more. Even when not explicitly mentioned, like in the post-Emancipation Caribbean, the Negro freedman was the object of vagrancy laws. The enormous dimension of American Emancipation must also be kept in mind, no less than 4 million people freed at the same time.

Very soon, however, what is called Radical Reconstruction would profoundly alter the relationship between planters and freedmen. Within the political framework of the Republican Party, blacks and their white allies, be it from the North ("carpetbaggers") or from the South ("scalawags") seized the control over the machinery of justice from the planters to defend workers and tenants against the landlords. As Eric Foner underscores, for a time, the United States became the only former slave society "where the freed slaves, within a few years of emancipation, enjoyed full political rights and a real measure of political power ... a stunning experiment in the nineteenth-century world ... to fashion an interracial democracy from the ashes of slavery" (1983:40).

Admittedly, Reconstruction under the Republicans, white and black, suffered from considerable weaknesses. Yet from a human and long-term perspective, the so-called Redemption by Southern Democrats toward 1877, with the withdrawal of the last federal troops, was a clearly backward step, indeed an unmitigated disaster. Though similar to many post-Emancipation measures in the Caribbean, the co-called Jim Crow segregation laws and norms were most efficient in keeping the blacks down as miserable sharecroppers without even a shadow of political influence (Woodward 1966). Moreover, the KuKluxKlan terrorism had no equivalent south of the United States.

From a foreign observer's viewpoint, however, the greatest peculiarity of all of the American scene in both North and South was not the blatant racism but the imposition and acceptance by whites and so-called "Blacks" alike of racial dichotomy. After Unionists entered New Orleans, the State legislature received the proposal espoused by local mulattoes in 1864 to let those with at most a fourth of Negro "blood" to be defined as whites. With the misgivings of blacks and whites alike, the Quadroon bill was soundly rejected (Litwack, 1979:535 f). As Winthrop D. Jordan has put it, by "classifying the mulatto as a Negro (the American) was in fact denying that intermixture had occurred at all" (1969, 178). In 1964, Gunnar Myrdal and his team would reveal to what a great degree the "Black" sector was actually mixed but by then attitudes had for long been fixed.

As everybody knows, the hundred year perspective on Emancipation
found Southern segregation in the midst of upheaval with actors ranging from the Supreme Court to individual blacks simply resisting Jim Crow. Probably nowhere else in the Americas, post-Emancipation development has been so loaded with conflict as in the United States.

Yet, referring to, for instance, the extent of white support for Jesse Jackson's Presidential campaign in 1988, change in attitudes has been exceptionally quick and still hopefully profound.

Emancipation took even longer in the Spanish Caribbean than in the United States but was also a much more gradual process. Like the United States had been, Cuba and Puerto Rico were settled by white colonists long before large plantations arose. The sugar boom reached Cuba in the 1760's, Puerto Rico seventy years later. In the 1840's, black slaves attained their maximum share of the population, 43 percent in Cuba, 14 in Puerto Rico. At the same time, free blacks and mulattoes formed 16 and 40 percent respectively. In Puerto Rico, slave labor in the sugar industry was complemented by means of vagrancy laws and debt peonage. More important, however, the expanding coffee industry was based on free labor (Bergad 1983) and was able to offset the decline of sugar industry caused by Emancipation in 1873/76. Hundred years later, the smoothness of slavery and "racial harmony" of Puerto Rican society over time formed part of a consensus. Recent research only has provided a more nuanced picture.

In the case of Cuba, the lateness of final Emancipation (1886) made it more urgent to explain the reasons for this delay than to explain what finally triggered the definitive measure. Was the main reason to be found in the vacillations of Metropolitan policy, in the stubbornness of the plantocracy, or in the inherent contradictions between production based on slavery and the need for technological innovation? In his famous "El Ingenio" in 1964, Manuel Moreno Fraginals persuasively argued along the lines of the third alternative (1978). To understand the vigor of Cuban slavery, naturally, a crucial fact is that of illegal slave imports continuing on a large scale until the 1860's. Also, massive introduction of Chinese Coolies, some 142,000 between 1847 and 1874, helped to satisfy the labor demand of the booming sugar industry. According to Moreno, they formed an important bridge between traditional and modern sugar production.

Skilfully challenging, in part, both Moreno's and other earlier interpretations, in the 1980's Rebecca Scott has argued that in the 1870's sugar technology was most advanced precisely where plantation slavery was most ingrained (1977). She has also stressed the diversity of labor systems during slavery's last phase. While in 1840, slaves formed 78 percent of the Cuban labor force, the share had shrunk to merely 23 by 1880. The free birth law of
1870 would be a kind of Spanish response to the Cuban insurrection of 1868, to begin with quite ambivalent on the issue of slavery. In Scott's view, the Moret law meant an extent of social change under tight control by both planters and government. Also, she points at slave disposal during the last phase of land parcels that turned them into a kind of "protopeasants" to use the term coined by Sidney Mintz (1961). Yet they remained subject to physical punishment and other forms of coercion even during the Cuban variety of apprenticeship (Patronato) from 1880 through 1886. Meanwhile, from 1870 more or less to 1890, sugar production experienced a crucial separation between its agricultural and industrial stages. A far from homogenous group of farmers (Colonos), of whatever color, emerged but was quite dependent on the sugar mills of the French West Indian type, centrales with a labor force composed both of slaves, and others.

Whereas in the United States, war introduced Emancipation, in Cuba, war, that of Independence in 1895-98, followed very soon after Emancipation. Yet, freedmen had already encountered a lot of disappointments, frequent unemployment, the persistence of ethnic barriers and the competition for jobs with poor Spanish immigrants. This made them join rebel forces with bitterness and anger. Also, the rebellion of 1912, coming a generation after Emancipation like the Morant Bay protest, largely reflected black frustration over discrimination in a dynamic capitalist society (Mörner 1973:36 f; compare Pérez 1986).

With a hundred year perspective, we can observe today in Cuba a most bewildering combination of very obvious political change introduced by the 1959 Castro revolution and underlying economic and psychological continuities. Blacks still no doubt find themselves apart from whites and mulattoes in Fidel Castro’s Cuba. No Jesse Jackson could reasonably be expected to succeed him as the absolute ruler. Such vestiges of racism like the continued sugar monoculture, however, seem to constitute a legacy of slavery rather than a legacy of the gradual and complex process of Emancipation.

Let us finally briefly take up the case of Brazil. First, we have to notice that slave based plantations had been predominant there since the early 1500's. when whites were very few, indeed. Consequently, the sector of free blacks and mulattoes in the nineteenth century had become unusually large. In 1872, with 4.2 million they were almost three times as many as the slaves. Out of a total of 10 millions, their number was also almost half a million higher than that of those classified as "whites". Mulattoes in 1872 formed no less than 78 percent of this huge sector of people of color whereas merely 32 percent of the slaves.

This demographic and legal structure constitutes the basic difference with that of the United States and helps to explain the very different patterns
of race relations in the two countries as by now many scholars have pointed out. As different also from the United States, Brazil apparently depended very much on outside slave supply. After slave imports had been cut off toward 1860, largely due to British pressure, increasing numbers of slaves were thus transferred by sale from the previously predominant sugar region of Northeast Brazil down south to the booming coffee districts of the provinces of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. By 1887, some 270,000 of the national total of 723,000 slaves were to be found in these two provinces compared with merely 170,000 in the Northeast.

In 1871 the Rio Branco law decreed free birth but included a variety of apprenticeship according to which the ingenuos would serve the owners of their mothers for a period of 21 years. It was a cautious compromise in the face of world opinion and the United States example. It is only recently that anti-slavery action in Brazil has been given the attention it undoubtedly deserves. Historian Robert Conrad in his book on the destruction of Brazilian slavery (1972) focussed on the forceful abolitionist movement from 1879 onwards. His colleague, Robert Brent Toplin (1971) instead emphasized the action taken by the slaves themselves, that is their mass desertions from the plantations. In Toplin's view, Emancipation in Brazil "was sudden, not gradual" (1971:245) because the number of slaves only fell dramatically from its average level since the mid-1870's after 1885.

The much-debated question about the extent to which the vengeance of embittered planters contributed to the collapse of the Brazilian Empire will be left aside. But it deserves to be noticed that slave owners in 1888 never got the indemnification they were insisting on.

Instead, it seems more relevant to our theme to discuss however briefly how post-Emancipation developments affected the lives and conditions of the ex-slaves and their descendants. First, the economic consequences of Emancipation varied widely from region to region. In Pernambuco by 1888, like in Cuba, sugar production was already being transformed through the separation of central factories, usinas, and agricultural activities, increasingly based on free labor of whatever color but inexpensive due to the lack of job alternatives. Dropping sugar prices, not Emancipation were the main problem of sugar producers. In Bahia, Emancipation brought at least temporary difficulties when ex-slaves spontaneously abandoned plantations when they heard about the "Lei Auréa" of 1888. As shown by Stanley J. Stein in his brilliant study (1970) of a coffee county in the Parahyba Valley of Rio de Janeiro from 1850 to 1900, the turmoil was only temporary, there, too, but Emancipation did accelerate a long term decline already in motion.

In São Paulo, on the other hand, Emancipation barely affected the rising
curve of coffee production which soon continued to rise in an impressive fashion. The reason, as is well known, was because European immigrants immediately replaced the slaves in the coffee fazenda labor force, as pointed out by sociologist Florestan Fernandes in his pioneering work on Negro integration into class society (1965). That is, an integration into the lowest category of that society. In a provocative article (1988), George Reid Andrews challenges Fernandes socio-psychological and cultural interpretation of why ex-slaves were pushed out by immigrants on São Paulo labor markets. In Andrews’ view, the policy of the State of São Paulo undercut the bargaining position of national labor by flooding the market with immigrant labor, the travel of whom had been subsidized. Under these circumstances, the demands raised by embittered ex-slaves proved less acceptable to planters than those of humble immigrant groups. As elsewhere, ex-slaves were loath to let their women and children go back to plantation work, whereas Italians with large families did not have these inhibitions, for example. Not until the 1920’s, according to Andrews, did immigrant demands reach a degree of militancy that made employers better disposed toward national labor.

As different from Fernandes, Andrews does not find any essential difference in the quality of work performance and the degree of “social disorganization” (Fernandes’ concept) between ex-slave and immigrant labor. What Andrews offers is an outline open criticism on several scores. Instead of deliberately adopting the North American bi-racial approach for his Brazilian subject, I think he would be well advised to use the concept of ethnicity in order to distinguish blacks from mulattoes, and Brazilian whites, Italians and other immigrant groups from each other. There is reason to believe that their positions normally differed on labor markets. Moreover, the passing from Pardo (= mulatto) to white status in connection with social ascent must have been a phenomenon of certain importance. As Emilia Viotti da Costa puts it, “Whether in rural or urban areas, mulattos as a whole were more upwardly mobile than their darker skinned brethren” (Costa 1985:186). Also, those pushed out by immigrants from the fazendas seem to have been ex-slaves rather than “agregados” or “caipiras”, the latter being darkskinned but hard to classify in racial terms. In the district of Rio Claro, according to Warren Dean (1976:172), in 1905 Brazilian born workers formed at least a fourth of the plantation work force.

To place the phenomenon studied by Fernandes, Andrews, and others within a larger framework, let me quote Michael Hall (1974: 192): “Mass immigration in Brazil left the essential structures of power unchanged. In fact, by providing a readibly exploitable labor force at a key period immigration may even have strengthened such structures. Moreover, Italian student Chiara
Vangelista (1982) persuasively argues that by tying Italian families to the fazendas by means of the colonato variety of sharecropping, São Paulo planters obtained all the continuity and stability needed by an export economy system. As before, the labor supply was essentially external, from abroad, like slaves had first come from Africa, later from the Northeast\textsuperscript{23}. For planters, the essential thing was that, according to Luis Lisanti, there was an almost threefold increase in the productivity of labor on São Paulo fazendas between 1886 and 1905 (1971:391 ff.)\textsuperscript{24}.

With a secular perspective, I certainly share Andrews' view of Brazil today as a "country of marked racial inequality". He is also correct in not ascribing this very obvious fact merely to the tradition of slavery. What happened in the case of São Paulo was clearly a new arrangement of labor supply to maintain the status quo in favor of a landowing elite. Thus, like in much less promising parts of Brazil, in São Paulo the "blacks" in a strict sense, remained on the bottom of the social ladder. Social mobility as such has been very slow in Brazil. Perhaps, also, the very fluidity and vagueness of ethnic distinctions deprived the blacks of many potential leaders who instead tried to and succeeded in being accepted into higher socio-racial strata. In whatever case, Emancipation so far brought remarkably little improvement to the descendants of the slaves ... beyond freedom.

The main questions formulated by the organizers of the Meeting on Emancipation in Pittsburgh in 1988 appeared straightforward at the first glance. What did Emancipation accomplish? How significant was the end of slavery? Was there "a continuity amid conflict" between slavery and contemporary society with its ingredients of racism? Yet I hope that already my very brief and elementary account, country by country, has revealed something about the variety and complexity of the process in the various countries of the New World. Straightforward answers to the questions referred too certainly involve a high degree of generalization. To reach generalization comparison in normally employed (Mörner 1982:57 f.). As David H. Fischer stresses, however, generalization, though unavoidable in history, "in ordinary usage means everything and nothing" (1970:103). For a purpose like ours, anyway, Robert Berkhofer makes a very relevant distinction: "...to produce interesting generalization requires complex units of analysis, but complex units of analysis increase the problem of establishing the comparability of the units" (1971:255).

When we then have to take up the issue in comparitive terms, it should, of course, be made clear that, per se, it is just as valid a goal for historical comparison to formulate generalizations through the observation of recurrences as to demonstrate uniqueness through observation of differences\textsuperscript{25}. 
Or, in the words of Sidney Mintz, an anthropologist exceptionally familiar with the Caribbean and endowed with a keen historical sense: "History never repeats itself exactly, and every event is, of course, unique; but historical forces surely may move in parallel paths at the same or different times. The comparisons of such parallels may reveal regularities of potential scientific value" (1959:73). On principle I share William H. Sewell's belief that, theoretically, there are no limits on the size or other qualities of the units of comparison, as long as they serve our purpose (1967:211-14). Yet, if you believe, as I do myself that chance does at time have important historical consequences, then, when making use of comparison, you have to reduce the scope of chance as much as possible.

To some extent, as Dutch historian Slicher van Bath underlines, this implies that, on the whole, economic and social history lend themselves better to comparison than does political history (1967:176). However, as should be wellknown, there are two basic types of comparison related to the aims of generalization and demonstration of uniqueness, close and distant comparison. The former takes place in the case of units showing a high degree of analogy, that is more or less similar structures, reasonably close to each other in time and/or space. This means that variables not subject to comparison are brought under control. Logically, close comparisons focus on differences between the units of comparison. Especially with respect to our purpose here, however, it is also important to have in mind that only through close comparison can impressions about fundamental, profound similarities be confirmed.

Distant comparison, on the other hand, focus on such similarities that may emerge, notwithstanding the distance in time and/or time and many distinctive features. The justification of distant comparison as an analytical tool in history has sometimes been denied. In my view, however, experience shows that this type of comparison precisely may prove most stimulating and give rise to early research hypotheses, but always provided that the entire social context and historical environment of the respective unit of comparison is duly kept in mind. As Barrington Moore declares, distant comparison may lead us to ask "very useful and sometimes new questions" (1966:xiij) and so far I think he proved it himself. At the same time, both his and other bold comparative syntheses reveal that risks and pitfalls also abound with this approach. In particular, if in distant comparison the obvious contrasts are being emphasized instead of worthwhile parallels, comparison becomes meaningless.

In diachronic comparison, units are being compared with each other at different points along a time axis; through synchronic comparison, different units are being compared at a given moment in time. Even though the former may look attractive, I believe historians should be utterly cautious when
making this kind of comparison. After all, to me at least, the overwhelming importance of the time dimension has become increasingly decisive. With different time dimensions, the number of variables, known and unknown, tend greatly to increase. Slicher van Bath, on the whole, identifies diachronic comparison with that of processes and synchronic comparison with that of structures. Therefore, he claims, comparison is more useful for the analysis of structures than for that of processes (1967: 172). His assertion would be relevant to our problem here but I find it rather doubtful. As Raymond Grew (1988:76) observes, it is rather the question of somewhat different approaches. The comparison of “processes calls attention to the problem of definition”, while the “comparison of structures calls attention to the danger of abstraction”.

At the first glance, the change from slavery to free labor would appear to be a most promising field for comparison. Especially so, when we limit ourselves to plantation slavery. Moreover, in the Caribbean, Northeast Brazil and Louisiana the predominant plantation crop was the same, sugar. By now, the simplistic comparison cultivated in the 1940’s through 60’s between a “North American slave system” and a “Latin American” one is now fortunately out of date.

Yet it remains obviously completely valid to search for the possible importance of legal, institutional and cultural differences between the various plantation societies before and after Emancipation. I am far from denying their importance. So, for example, the legal rules and habits governing manumission would be important incl. for post-Emancipation society in so far that they determined the size and character of the sector of free people of color on the eve of Emancipation26.

Other such differences, however, are much more subtle and perhaps impossible to gauge. With sociologist Harry Hoetink I think it is likely that what he calls “somatic norm images”, that is the different perceptions of racial differences on the part of slave holders belonging to various national/ethnic groups may have influenced their attitudes to the slaves and their descendants (1967). But the importance of such a phenomenon would be very hard to prove.

As in all historical analysis, in comparison it is paramount that the concepts used be clear and unequivocal. If a comparison is launched between post-Emancipation United States and Brazil, the fact of differing widely the idea of what is Negro/Black in the two countries emerges as a very serious problem. Thomas Skidmore who tried to undertake such a comparison did not hesitate in calling the difference of racial categorization the “greatest single difference in race relations” between the two countries (1972:10)27. This is so even though the United States censuses for 1870, 1890 and 1910 did enumerate mulattoes as a special category.
In whatever case, I hope that my preceding account has shown that demographic, economic and also political factors often possessed a basic and tangible importance. They can also be illustrated from Skidmore’s perceptive study: a) Gradual/Total Emancipation respectively in Brazil and the United States, b) Widely different sizes of the free colored population in the two countries as a result of the duration of slave imports, very different slave fertility rates, and manumission norms/rates in the two countries, c) The increasingly regional character and concentration of slaves in the United States versus the nationwide character of slavery in Brazil even though its importance varied widely from region to region and even vanished in some provinces a few years prior to 1888. Skidmore does not go into the differential economic factors, certainly most important ones. Among other things, as Klein and Engerman (1983) point out, in Sao Paulo the flexible nature of coffee production did not necessarily require the gang labor type of the phase of slavery to ensure high productivity.

As we already discussed, however, the new colonato variety of sharecropping would be based on Italian immigrants and their families replacing ex-slaves. In the Northeast, the gradual adaptation to free labor had started already prior to Emancipation. According to Peter Eisenberg, wage labor and squatting were probably the most common ways in which ex-slaves, with scarce alternatives, would uphold the sugar economy (1977:358). In the United States South, cotton lent itself also to more small-scale production. This would be rational behind a planter-ex-slave compromise in favor of sharecropping (Klein and Engerman 1983:47). The Brazil-United States comparison quickly outlined suggests that differences were so profound that only rather commonplace similarities remain, such as some common basic features of plantation slavery and the depressed status of ex-slaves and their descendants. It cannot possibly rank as more than quite a distant comparison.

Let us now make another attempt at comparison where, at the least, both parties had the same predominant plantation crop and where there was also some connection between Emancipation and the struggle for Independence. I refer to Haiti and Cuba. Towards Emancipation each of them was the greatest sugar producer in the world. Yet, separated as they are by almost hundred years, they existed in entirely different worlds. Even so, however, the comparison is also complicated by the possibility I already alluded to, that is that the violent Haitian upheaval may have made the Cuban slave system more resistant and durable.

As a matter of fact, many slave owners from St. Domingue and their slaves found a refuge in Cuba (Badura 1971). Thus, obviously, the time dimension often proves crucial for the feasibility of comparison. Factors like
political conditions (incl. those of the Metropolitan powers), market dependence and prices, technology, ideas like abolitionism and pseudo-scientific racism all present a very strong diachrony or changeability over time.

Under these conditions, would not strictly synchronical comparison be the solution of our methodological dilemma? After all, it would eliminate the time dimension as a complicating factor. In his exiting comparison between sugar production and labor systems in Puerto Rico and Jamaica, 1800-50, Mintz (1959) did exactly this. His main finding, however, was that during the same time period, the two colonies moved in exactly the opposite direction within the sugar productive cycle.

This is a fact of fundamental importance which completely overshadows the other differences also to be found between the two units of comparison. Thus, it even makes it somewhat questionable if, however synchronic, this is really a case of close comparison. When, instead, you compare post-Emancipation developments in different parts of the British Caribbean, you have some advantages. The synchrony can easily be complete. Most institutional and cultural variables are under control. Even so, as we have already shown, Jamaica and Barbados, mainly due to their different sizes and placement within the sugar cycle, reveal profound differences.

Clearly, however, as William A. Green has shown, in his very careful comparison of the British sugar islands, 1830-65, the results are quite enlightening. As Green succinctly concludes, everywhere in the British sugar colonies Emancipation meant that the "routine brutality of slavery was gone, but the conditions which breed brutality were not" (1976:405).

If strictly synchronic comparison, despite everything has its limitations, perhaps the solution would lie rather in the comparison of more or less coeval analogous processes. I should imagine, for instance, that the cases of Jamaica and St. Domingue, on the eve of Emancipation would lend themselves well for a comparative study. Both found themselves in an ascending phase of sugar production and the socio-racial composition of their population was roughly similar. Yet, the ubiquitous time dimension may always present itself as a complication. Let us take, for instance, the adjustment of the sugar industry to crisis in Jamaica and Cuba respectively. We know that the British free trade policy as of 1846 would hit Jamaica very severely. In Cuba, on the contrary it was the combination of high United States and Spanish tariffs in 1894 that produced a crisis, at least superficially similar.

I am not alone in being very much aware of the difficulties and constraints of comparison to analyse plantation society. Let me once again quote Sidney Mintz (1977): "Within the Caribbean region, not only many differences from one colony to another can be specified, but also differences in terms of
maturation, apogee and decline of particular, specific systems. These local systems varied in the degree to which they were integrated into the world economy, and each historical instance requires careful and serious study”.

Instead of trying to launch any generalization based on systematic comparison about the effect of Emancipation, of its significance and how strong was the continuity between slavery and post-Emancipation racism, let me just suggest some especially crucial points in the social and political process from Emancipation until a century later.

1. Which were the proportions of slaves, free colored and whites of the total population of a given slave society on the eve of Emancipation? What was the status and what was the size of the mulatto group? Was there a white stratum of landless workers? Apart from plantation fieldhands and the like, was there a sizeable number of urban and/or skilled slaves that Emancipation set free?

2. How did Emancipation come about? Gradually or at once, with or without compensation to the former owners, with a transition period of apprenticeship or without? By war, under the menace of rebellion or large-scale desertions or as a concession to liberal and/or abolitionist ideas materialized in political interest groups within or outside the country in question? Did the slaves themselves fight as soldiers for their freedom?

3. To what extent did racist discrimination derived from prejudice and fears for ex-slave competition serve the purpose of the landowning elite of maintaining the depressed social conditions of darkskinned people? To what a degree and for what reasons did other groups such as immigrants enjoy advantages in the competition for jobs with blacks or mulattoes, or was it perhaps, occasionally, the other way around? Was upward social mobility normally high (as in the United States) so that discrimination, or, to use Max Weber’s concept, a “strategy of closure of exclusion” could easily be based on racist criteria? If, on the other hand, social mobility was normally low, the resort to racial discrimination would obviously appear to be less necessary from the white elite’s point of view.

4. Emancipation, per se, implied a redistribution of property. Would it affect the distribution of income as well? This depended on the bargaining power of the slaves, normally rather weak, however. If they were fieldhands with no other skills, did they have any real alternatives to remaining on or returning to plantations as wage earners? If all available land was already occupied by plantations (e.g. Barbados) they had, indeed, no alternative. Did the former owners have any better alternative (immigrants, coolies or others) to continue using them as such? Would, perpahs, they even cost less than wage earners than
their maintenance costs as slaves? Could real rural wages after Emancipation even continue to drop (e.g. Pernambuco in the early 20th century)?

5. Would there be land available for ex-slaves to turn into an independent peasantry? Would market conditions permit them to produce partly for export or national markets or would they, on the whole, merely produce for subsistence? To what extent were peasants producing export goods directly affected by international business trends, for good or bad? How did those peasants who worked for parttime wages on plantations or elsewhere fare as indirect consequences of business fluctuations? Would freedmen make use of their freedom to move (if not tied down by indebtedness or illegal force) to other areas and better jobs?

6. How did planters try to remedy a supposed “shortage of labor” when freedmen did not accept bad wages and working conditions, or, out of bitter experience and for psychological reasons, did not let their women and children on plantations? By using collie, or South European contract labor to keep wages down (compare above $ 4)? Or by recourse to political authorities to provide forced labor by enacting vagrancy laws? Or, perhaps by offering darkskinned nationals better conditions?

7. What did abolitionism really mean for Emancipation and when/why did abolitionists, sooner or later, abandon ex-slaves to their more or less gloomy fate? To what an extent did planters benefit from government-imposed apprenticeship and the like? What did compensation/lack of compensation mean to them, economically and psychologically, and to what an extent did the government decision on this issue reflect their national power or, perhaps, relative lack of clout? Which were the main devices of pro-planter governments to exert legal discrimination against ex-slaves and other non-whites?

8. How did the freedmen and their descendants react against the various forms of discrimination and repression? After all, not always with mute sullenness and passivity. A series of outbursts conveying the anger and frustration of the black masses can be found in different places about a generation after Emancipation. Incidents like the Morant Bay massacre (1865), the Barbados riots (1876), the black uprising in Danish St. Croix (1878), the Brazilian navy revolt of mainly black sailors (1910) and the black revolt in Cuba (1912), despite many differences, seem to reflect precisely the frustration of the first post-Emancipation generation. It is essential to keep in mind, however, that the newly acquired legal rights of blacks would only lead to profound conflict in such countries or possessions where there existed an authentic popular participation in politics, or, at least some political tradition in that sense. This is why, one century after Emancipation, the belated struggle
for Civil Rights became as fierce as it did and gradually successful in the United States South. This is also why British Caribbean elites preferred to return their lands to Crown Colony status rather than letting blacks and mulattoes participate forcefully in the political autonomy. However, there too, a century later, time was ripe for the people of dark skin to combine political democracy with national Independence.

In other countries (especially Latin America), the freed blacks and mulattoes merely joined illiterate messes who had never exerted even a minimal influence as voters on national or even local politics, or would, for a long time to come, do so. Corruption also normally barred them from obtaining whatever legal rights they might possess. When a popular reaction came at long last, as in Cuba in 1959, it was by no means exclusive for people with dark skin, nor did it naturally lead to democracy. Black nationalism, finally, would only prosper, at least temporarily, when almost alone in voicing social protest or when expressing the emotions of popular majorities (Anglo or Francophone Caribbean).

As a final comment, let me say a few words about the dichotomies of generality/uniqueness as a goal of comparison and past/present.

In the words of Edward Hallett Carr (1961:80), “The historian is not really interested in the unique, but in what is general in the unique”. He goes on to say that the “...real point about generalization is that through it we attempt to learn from history, to apply the lessen drawn from one set of events to another set of events: when we generalize, we are consciously or unconsciously trying to do this” (1961:84).

Obviously, the interplay between past and present that both Carr and another classic, Marc Bloch, talk about is very much alive in the theme of Emancipation. Although familiar to many, Bloch’s key words deserve to be cited in this context: “Misunderstanding of the present is the inevitable consequence of ignorance of the past. But a man may wear himself out just as fruitlessly in seeking to understand the past, if he is totally ignorant of the present” (1953:43).

In this sense, Emancipation also helps to explain the story of the benevolent attempts of our own generations to resolve the problem of human misery through Welfare society of the West European type or President Johnson’s Great Society or Latin American land reforms. Today, in many West European countries we can observe, just like in post-Emancipation slave societies, how the fear for competition with darkskinned immigrants or refugees makes racism thrive above all among the lower national strata. We can also notice the sometimes glaring contrast between political rhetorics and deeds and the vague ambivalence of the powerholders when such delicate
subjects are on the agenda, just like in post-Emancipation politics. Yet, the prospects for our future do not have to be too dark, if post-Emancipation history would be repeated (by no means assured). After all, key words like “freedom” and “equality” at times became slow ripening seed where the soil was reasonably fertile. In some countries or regions, the concepts in question took on some reality generations after legal Emancipation had take place.

### TABLE I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territory and period</th>
<th>Year of Emancipation</th>
<th>Percentage change</th>
<th>Recovery to pre-Emancipation production level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica 1824/33-1839/46</td>
<td>1838</td>
<td>-51.2</td>
<td>1930's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Domingue/ Haiti 1791-1818/22</td>
<td>1793</td>
<td>-98.3</td>
<td>1960’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martinique 1843-50</td>
<td>1848</td>
<td>-29.6</td>
<td>1857-61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guadeloupe 1843-50</td>
<td>1848</td>
<td>-44.5</td>
<td>1868-72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana 1857/61-1866-70</td>
<td>1865</td>
<td>-75.2</td>
<td>1887-91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rico 1871/5-1877/82</td>
<td>1876</td>
<td>-20.9</td>
<td>1900-04</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brazil 1883/87-1889/94</td>
<td>1888</td>
<td>-32.8</td>
<td>1905-09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados 1824/33-1839/46</td>
<td>1838</td>
<td>+5.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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2. Dates incl. period of apprenticeship
3. Whenever possible a comparison between five-year averages
NOTES


2. Especially in the latter part of this paper I draw rather much on what I wrote in an article long ago (1973).


4. As Eric Hobsbawm (1975:141) puts it: "..it is difficult to envisage the survival of the (United States) South as a slave society into the twentieth century, anymore than the survival of serfdom in Eastern Europe, even if (like some schools of historians) we consider both economically viable as systems of production”. See also ibid. 184-88.

5. I am only going to take up a few more important cases where plantation slavery was important. With Degler (1979:11) I think this limitation is most useful because "plantation is not a legal construct", but a "Historian’s conception", based in economic and social reality. Yet I exclude in the Caribbean, many lesser British islands, the Dutch and Danish possessions and the Guianas. Most Spanish American countries where neither slavery nor plantations played any major role are also excluded.

6. For any study of this group under slavery, Cohen and Greene (1972) remains basic.

7. See also Nicholls (1985:167-85) for an analysis of the ethnic contents of Haitian rural revolts until 1869.

8. According to Drescher (1977:64) the plantations of Barbados in 1790 had been considered “at or past their optimal development while Jamaica then appeared as the ‘largest frontier’”.

9. The size of the peasantry of Jamaica should not be exaggerated, however. According to Marshall (1981:257) it formed merely 11 percent of the total population in 1860, 17.5 percent in 1890.

10. As a colored ex-member of the Legislative Assembly of Jamaica said to a white member of the new administration in 1869: "You and I have been equals, but what will be the respective position of our children. Yours will hardly speak to mine" (Hall 1959:263).
11. For Bolivar's attitude see e.g. Mörner (1983).

12. The transition from slavery (at times of the “protopeasantry” type, described by Mintz 1961) to the labor in the Valley of Cauca summarized by Kalmanovitz (1986:156-64).

13. According to Klein & Engerman (1985), 53, cotton production declined with 23.1 percent 1856/60-1867171. But in 1871-1875 a recovery to the pre-Emancipation level took place. From another point of view as well, Louisiana differed from the Southern cotton belt where post-Emancipation conflicts between planters and freedmen focused on access to land, through tenancy at the least. In sugar producing Louisiana, on the other hand, where “closely supervised gang labor persisted after the end of slavery”, such conflicts focused rather on the level of wages. Foner (1983:4).

14. As Stampp (1965:215) underlines, thanks to Radical Reconstruction the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments could be enacted and the Blacks be given “the ultimate promise of equal civil and political rights”.


15. Mintz (1974:100) finds that Emancipation “came relatively easily to Puerto Rico; but its enactment involved the pledge of certain guarantees to the planter classes ...” Also, slaveholders with 25 slaves or more “pressed hardest for emancipation, partly because they expected to benefit from indemnities, but also because of their probable superiority in attracting free labor after emancipation.

17. Articles and anthologies like those of Bergad (1983), Scarano (1985, 1986) and Ramos Mattei (1982) give this impression. Not least interesting of the findings is that about contract labor immigration from the British West Indies 1860-80 helped to soften the impact of Emancipation.

18. According to a law in 1885 slaves aged sixty years and above should also be set free. At that time, total Emancipation had already taken place in the province of Ceará (1883).

19. This would also apply to the urban sector. Interestingly, Eulalia María Lahmeyer Lobo (1985:93) points out that the working class in the city of Rio de Janeiro after Emancipation retained a much larger share of freedmen than that of São Paulo. In Rio, immigrants were largely illiterate Portuguese peasants. For current research on the transition in Rio’s rural sector see Nancy P. Smith Naro (1987:436 f.).

20. Demographer Giorgio Mortara has estimated that about 4 million people of color passed into the “white” category in Brazil, 1872-1940. Cohen and Greene
(1972:333).

21. It is also interesting to notice that in the same district in 1872, only 16.9 percent of the slaves were classed as mulattoes, whereas 74.3 percent of the total free population. Dean (1976:60 f.). See also his analysis of the special tension between mulattoes and whites, ibid. 127.

22. In an important work, Brazilian historian Emília Viotti da Costa (1966:467) concludes that Emancipation "representou uma etapa apenas na liquidação da estrutura colonial".

23. See also Vangelista (1985:224): "El brasileño y el antiguo esclavo ... fueron destinados a ocupaciones que, aunque ligadas con la vida de la hacienda, no se vinculaban con la producción misma del café". Consequently, a labor market took shape that was "dividida en segmentos, donde el criterio discriminatório era principalmente étnico". Italians were also favored at the expense of other immigrant groups.


25. The following discussion is mainly based on the article of mine, written together with Julia Fawaz de Viñuela and John French (1982). See also Grew (1980).

26. As shown by Highman (1984:382) in the 1810's to 30's, manumission both in Jamaica and Barbados was much more frequent in the urban than in the rural sector. Also (689), many more females were manumitted than men. Highman's work is based on good documentation and especially well carried out.

27. As Conrad (1983:317) points out in Brazil quite black skin did, indeed carry the stigma of slavery while mulattoes were "both more likely to be free and to be thought of as such..."

28. Gwendolyn Midlo Hall (1971) has tried to compare St. Domingue and Cuba, already a more difficult endeavor. Unfortunately, she did not produce any strict comparison at all, merely a readable essay.

29. Green has been criticized by Bolland (1981) who also emphasizes the role of the factor of control to explain the Barbados-Jamaica contrast. He refers mainly to Belize. For the rhythm of sugar production see my comments in Duncan and Rutledge (1977:463-70) and the articles there by B. Blouet, M. Taussig, P. Eisenberg and J. Reis.
30. For a brief, wellformulated attempt to synthesize the factors determining the slavery-free labor transition see Foner (1983:10).

31. In a quantitative analysis of 8,820 slaves in Guadeloupe, 1770-89, a sample comprising about 10 percent of all slaves, N. and M. Frisch (1987) find that mulattoes were most highly priced and that almost half of the men and a quarter of the women of that group held skilled positions within the labor force. This skilled group formed only 9 percent of all slaves.

32. Bradford Burns (1979:59 f.) underscores that in those Latin American nations "where slavery lingered after independence", black protest became endemic. He criticizes fellow historians to give too much credit for Emancipation to one or another "enlightened" political leader instead of the blacks themselves.

33. An excellent summary is that of Lloyd Best (1968:295 f.): "The terms on which the ex-slaves will offer labour to the plantation are determined by the amount of land which they can acquire and by the productivity of the land. The greater the amount of land available to the cultivators and the higher the productivity, the more restricted the supply available to the plantation, and the greater the upward pressure on wage rates. The labour market is also affected in a very special way by the high value placed on independence which fixes a minimum requirement of own-account production and by taste patterns which dictate a minimum requirement of imported consumption goods. These are the parameters fixed by the legacy of slavery... (Farmers) enforce restrictive land and credit policies on the government with the intention of limiting the amount of land which cultivators can acquire. Similarly, in education policy, they oppose efforts by the government and the church to equip the population with skills that would enhance the productivity of the domestic sector. They attempt the restrict entry into the urban areas. Finally, they impose taxation on imports in order to reduce the purchasing power of wages and so to draw more labour to the market". As Foner (1983:25) sees it, "freedmen, through taxation, financed the bringing in of laborers whose purpose was to reduce their own standard of living". Also, he stresses that taxation has always been the main state means of promoting "market relations within peasant societies".

34. In Foner's view (1983:18), the "rise of the peasantry was as much a response to the conditions of emancipation as a legacy of slavery".

35. For instance, in Colombia, slaves moved from coastal plantations to the River Magdalena Valley to find jobs as woodcutters or roarsmen (Mörner 1973:32).

36. The refusal of the slaves to send their women and children to plantation work can, of course also been seen simply, as Foner (1983:19) does, as an "attempt to reconstruct family life".
37. Graham (1970) suggests that the attitude of Brazilian landowners against the Empire in 1889 was due to their fears that under that fragile regime, abolitionists would be able to push through some land reform scheme.

38. The post-Emancipation process can, of course, be seen primarily as "an ongoing if unequal conflict", a struggle for control of available resources, first of all the "labor of the former slaves" themselves, as Foner (1983:37) puts it.

39. Perhaps the Combahee strike of 1876, in the rice region of South Carolina with a rather peculiar type of American slave society, described by Foner (1983:74-110) can also be counted among such outbursts. A strike among Louisiana black sugar workers in 1887 led to a large-scale massacre at the hands of state militia (106).

40. According to Soares and Silva (1987), in the 1982 Brazilian elections mulattoes favored one candidate, the blacks another. Possibly, the ethnic contents of politics in Brazil are on the increase.

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