

STATE AND MILITARY: SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON LATIN AMERICA AND THE BRAZILIAN CASE

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Introduction

The main purpose of this paper is to discuss some problems related to the restructuring of the relations between state and social classes that has taken place in Brazil since the 1960s. More specifically I intend to look at: 1) the links between military ideology and capitalist development; 2) the meaning of national development viewed at the policy level.

Before proceeding to the discussion of these aspects I shall, however, comment on some general problems of analysing the state in Latin America.

I. Some Considerations on Analyses of the State in Latin America

The conception of the capitalist state is one of the most debated issues in political theory in the last decade. Within the Western-European Marxist current this debate has developed along basically two lines. Some authors have emphasised the economic determination of the capitalist state (e.g. E. Altvater, D. Läßle, D. Yaffe, J. Hirsch), while others have analysed the state in terms of its societal determination, i.e. its class basis (an outstanding representative is N. Poulantzas). In the United States the discussion has developed within "radical sociology", but also the notion of the 'corporatist' state has gained much influence. Some authors, however, have broken with these tendencies and presented contributions to a Marxist theory of the state (most notable are the works by James O'Connor).

In Latin America, like in Asia and Africa, analyses of political structures and political development were for a long time dominated by the so-called "theories

of political development or modernisation", presented in the well-known works by G. Almond, J. S. Coleman, D. Apter among others. In the sixties a critical approach to these works was presented in the studies on dependency (e.g. those by F. H. Cardoso, E. Faletto, T. dos Santos, A. Gunder Frank and V. Bamba). The dependency approach had an important critical effect on development studies in Latin America, and in Europe I suppose, but it has always had a tendency to put forward sweeping generalisations and avoided tackling the important theoretical problems a concrete analysis presents. However, the dependency debate now seems to fade out or rather, it is being transformed into an interest for carrying out concrete analyses of the state, the peculiar role of military institutions, military ideology, bureaucratic state apparatus, state enterprises, etc. It should be mentioned in this context that apart from some considerations on the importance of state bureaucracy and state enterprises by several "dependentistas", some studies on the state in Latin America were written at the same time, or even before the debate started in Western Europe and the United States. I am thinking of the works by O. Ianni, F. Weffort and M. Kaplan.¹

The present debate is linked to some important changes that have taken place in Latin America since the middle of the 1960s. Firstly, a dynamic process of restructuring the economy under the dominance of foreign capital but with the state taking on a wide range of economic functions. Secondly, the change in the form of state imposed by military rule in the Southern Cone, Brazil and Peru.²

I shall not discuss in detail the various modes of interpretation that have evolved³ but it is worth mentioning that with the particular characteristics a debate in Latin America necessarily will develop, it has also been heavily influenced by European and North American works on the subject.⁴

¹ Octavio Ianni, *Estado e Capitalismo*. Civilização Brasileira, Rio de Janeiro 1965. Francisco Weffort, "Estado e Massas no Brasil", *Revista Civilização Brasileira*, no. 7, May 1966. Marcos Kaplan, *El estado en el desarrollo y la integración en América Latina*. Monte Avila, Caracas 1970.

² I don't argue that these changes have not taken place elsewhere but they have been more profound in some countries than in others.

³ See e.g.: Philip O'Brien, "The Emperor has No Clothes: Class and State in Latin America". *The State and Economic Development in Latin America*, ed. by E. V. K. Fitzgerald, E. Floto, A. D. Lehmann, Centre of Latin American Studies, University of Cambridge, 1977.

⁴ This goes with the exception of the debate in Germany. Only a few of the studies on the capitalist state written in the German language have been translated into English or a Romance language and, therefore, they are almost unknown in Latin America. This is not a mere question of language, but one of philosophical tradition. For a recent contribution see: Tilman Evers, *Bürgerliche Herrschaft in der Dritten Welt. Zur Theorie des Staates in ökonomisch unterentwickelten Gesellschaftsformationen*. Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Köln/Frankfurt am Main 1977. The book contains an extensive bibliography.

If we try to overlook the more detailed and specified elaborations on the concept of the state and its forms and functions, I will argue that the analysis of the capitalist state poses two general problems: on one hand, to conceive the various forms of the state as an expression of class contradictions without making the state into an instrument (of a class or class fraction) or into an autonomous institution with a power of its own; on the other hand, to relate the state to the process of capital accumulation without abandoning the separation between the political and the economic, which, according to Marx, defines the capitalist mode of production.

In many analyses of the state in Latin American countries, and in Asia and Africa, there is a tendency to underline the autonomy of the state apparatus and the power of the military and/or bureaucracy. This goes back to the general idea of the hypertrophy of superstructure in relation to the structure of society in general, but is also a reflection of how political power is conceived in political theory (pluralist, structural-functionalist and other variants) and in "radical sociology". In the former the state is a neutral entity favouring the interests of competitive groups in society, while in the latter the state is not neutral in relation to social classes but it is autonomous unless the dominant social class is unified and personally linked to the highest posts in the state apparatus.

An example of this interpretation of state autonomy can be found in an article by Horowitz and Trimberger.⁵ It is assumed that a bureaucratic state apparatus can be considered autonomous when those who hold the highest civil and military posts satisfy two conditions: a) they are not recruited from the landed, commercial or industrial classes, nor do they have personal vested interests in the dominant means of production; b) such bureaucrats are not controlled by or subordinate to a parliamentary or party apparatus which represents the dominant interests.⁶ This conception, the authors claim, makes possible a clear distinction between state power and class power. In other words, control of the governing apparatus is a source of power independent of that held by a class or class fraction through its control of the means of production.

It is implicit in this contention that the authors want to avoid making the state into a simple instrument of the dominant class. They also underline that this is necessary in order to analyse the periphery's position of being last in the history of modernisation and industrialisation.⁷ This means that the state appa-

⁵ Irving Louis Horowitz & Ellen Kay Trimberger, "State Power and Military Nationalism in Latin America", *Comparative Politics*, vol. 8:2, January 1976.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 226.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 228—229.

ratus achieves dynamic autonomy during a period of economic transition, if the two before-mentioned conditions are fulfilled.⁸

The use of the terms 'state power' and 'autonomy of the state apparatus' implies that the state as an institution can be considered as being external to social classes in certain periods of societal development. State institutions enter the political struggle taking place in society as an independent force and the dynamically autonomous state apparatus becomes the driving force behind the transformation of social formations in the periphery. Although political power is attributed to social classes, it is *also* attributed to the state apparatus in *certain periods of transition*.⁹ This is the problematic point in the contention.

Let us try to illustrate this with a concrete case, using the notion of dynamic autonomy. In 1964 the Brazilian military takes over the control of the state apparatus with the result that the state apparatus achieves dynamic autonomy from the means of production, i.e. from the dominant classes. It becomes an independent force and can through its control of state resources — economic, coercive and ideological — dominate social classes in general. This situation prevails until a new change takes place and one consolidated class arises establishing control of the economy and the state apparatus. Dynamic autonomy can no longer be attributed to the state apparatus, neither can political power.

The main problem with this mode of analysis is to be found in the way in which the principal power relation in society is identified. In the period of transition, in which the state apparatus achieves dynamic autonomy, the principal power relation is that established between state apparatus and social classes. When one consolidated class takes over control, and political power can no longer be attributed to the state apparatus, power relations can only be established between social classes. In this way the analysis of concrete state forms and functions becomes a question of attributing power to the state apparatus, when certain conditions are fulfilled. The analysis is purely formal (and thus ahistorical and static) because there is no way of explaining *how* changes are introduced in the relations between state apparatus and social classes. This mode of analysis also implies a formal distinction between two forms of capitalist development. In the one form social classes have the principal role in the reproduction of the capitalist formation, while this role is attributed to the state apparatus in the other.

⁸ It is not clear what is meant by economic transition. Trimberger presents elsewhere a more specified consideration. Economic transition refers to a period in which "no dominant mode of production and no one consolidated class control the economy"; Ellen Kay Trimberger, "State Power and Modes of Production: Implications of the Japanese Transition to Capitalism", *The Insurgent Sociologist*, vol. VII:2, Spring 1977, p. 86.

⁹ There is no claim of the state being a neutral entity, neither is political power attributed to competitive groups in society.

Of course, all this takes us back to the much debated question of the relative autonomy of the state.¹⁰ I shall not go into a discussion of this complicated problem but only say very briefly how the capitalist state can be conceived in terms of political hegemony and domination. Whatever role of the state is to be analysed (economic functions, coercion, political organiser, ideology, etc.), this role has to be conceived at two "levels":

- a) the state assures the general political interests of the power bloc under the hegemony of a class or fraction of class;
- b) the state organises political domination in relation to the dominated classes and the social formation as such (reproduction of capitalism).

If, for example, we find that there is a tendency towards the installation of a specific form of state/regim (e.g. military dictatorships) in Latin America, the explanation for this is to be found in the precise role attributed to the state in the particular context of capitalist development with related conjunctures of political struggle. Whatever role is performed by state institutions (e.g. the military or the bureaucracy) in a concrete formation, this role is always given by the continuous struggle for hegemony of a certain class or fraction and for the establishment of the general political interests of the power bloc. State institutions cannot set aside the limits set by this struggle and concrete state functions always correspond to class interests.

When it is stressed that the state in Latin America has gained a kind of independence through direct participation in the relations of production (the question of state capital), we have to bear in mind that the problematic still has to be seen in terms of political hegemony and domination. The formation of a state bourgeoisie in command of large industrial enterprises should not lead us to the illusion that the state in peripheral capitalism has become autonomous.¹¹

II. State and Military in Brazil

When analysing a situation in which the military dominates the state apparatus — and this is the case in Brazil since 1964 — we cannot assume that military officers are in direct control of the various branches of the state apparatus. Although we find that a number of ministries, bureaucratic institutions and state enterprises are directed by military people, we must remember that this

¹⁰ For some clarifications see: Nicos Poulantzas, "The Capitalist State: A Reply to Miliband and Laclau", *New Left Review*, no. 95, Jan.-Febr. 1976, esp. p. 71—75.

¹¹ For some considerations see: E. V. K. Fitzgerald, "On State Accumulation in Latin America", *The State and Economic Development in Latin America*, op. cit.; E. V. K. Fitzgerald, "The Public Investment Criterion and the Role of the State", *The Journal of Development Studies*, vol. 13:4, July 1977.

is also the case before 1964. High-ranking officers, often retired from active service, have traditionally been in charge of the state-owned oil company, PETROBRAS, and the National Steel Company (CSN), presidents of governmental councils and commissions, etc. It is probably true that a number of top posts within the federal government and state governments, not occupied by officers in the pre-1964 period, has been taken over by the military, but military dominance within the state apparatus has to be analysed at other levels. In the Brazilian case the role of civilian bureaucrats within the "militarised state" is of particular interest. This aspect will be discussed at the end of this paper. But first some comments on military ideology and economic development.

In order to understand the role of the military in the development of dependent capitalism it is necessary to stress that, while contradictions on the societal level are reflected in the military institution (a given form of state is a product of such contradictions), there are problems that are specific to military organisation, e.g. the importance of discipline, internal unity and potential conflicts between branches of the armed forces. Such problems have to be taken into consideration when analysing state and military in any capitalist formation. In Brazil the development of a military ideology (national security — national development) came to play an important role. Within the military it served as a focus of unity and externally it became a focus of action.

It is not my intention to enter a discussion of pre-1964 military history.¹² I will only outline the basic background. Historically the Brazilian military has been linked with European thinking of warfare. An example of this was the strong ties between the Brazilian and the German armies. However, a change in this pattern was introduced during the Second World War when the Brazilian army participated in the campaign in Italy together with the U.S. army. This was the beginning of an important relationship between the two armies, which was to be developed after the War. Brazil began to receive military aid and training from the U.S., and in 1949 the National War College (Escola Superior de Guerra — ESG) was founded with the support of the North Americans. The college represented a fundamental change in the training of officers, because an integration of military instruction and schooling in development problems took place. Furthermore, one of the main courses was given to officers *and* civilians.¹³

¹² A well-documented study on military and politics in Brazil is: Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics. Changing Patterns in Brazil*. Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, 1971. Other studies are: Nelson Werneck Sodré, *História Militar do Brasil*. Civilização Brasileira, Rio de Janeiro, 1968. Edmundo Campos Coelho, *Em Busca de Identidade: o Exército e la Política na Sociedade Brasileira*. Forense-Universitária, Rio de Janeiro, 1976. *Perspectives on Armed Politics in Brazil*. Ed. by Henry H. Keith & Robert A. Hayes. Center for Latin American Studies, Arizona State University. Tempe 1976.

¹³ For information on this see: A. Stepan, *op.cit.*, p. 174—83.

The instruction in the National War College was and is based on the doctrine of *national security — national development*, which is basically a critique of political and economic development in Brazil. This development is seen in the context of the main confrontation in the World: West against East, capitalism against communism. In order to combat communism in Brazil ("internal subversion") a total development strategy is necessary.¹⁴ This strategy is a combination of internal warfare and economic development. Of the principal aspects of the doctrine it was the conception of national security, in terms of internal warfare, that was elaborated in the pre-1964 period. The immediate problems of subversion, communist threat and revolutionary warfare were those to be considered seriously by the military in the moment of political crisis, not a strategy of economic development.¹⁵

The notion of national security served as a basis for unity within the higher ranks at the instant of coup and during the subsequent purge of dissident officers. There is no doubt that also fractions of the bourgeoisie united under the banner of national security.

The consolidation and elaboration of a military ideology — capitalist, anti-communist and nationalist in its own way — since 1964, unveil a continual struggle within the armed forces, and it is also a reflection of how ideological options relate to conjunctural problems of society. If the Brazilian military had a clear economic and political project for the country in 1964, it is certainly very difficult to see how this project materialised in concrete policies. Not that the new regime didn't have any policies, it had! But it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to trace them back to manifestations of military ideology.¹⁶

If we look at some of the documents concerning the doctrine of national security — national development, it is possible to establish a picture of why the state under military dominance must engage in total war against "subversion", but it becomes more difficult to see what *national development* is about.

¹⁴ An "inside" account of the doctrine is: Augusto Fragoso, "A Doutrina de Desenvolvimento e Segurança. Origem — Evolução — Atualidade", *Segurança e Desenvolvimento*, ano XXIV, no. 160, 1975. Much of the non-classified material from the ESG is published in *Segurança e Desenvolvimento*, which is the journal of the ESG alumni group. See also: José Alfredo Amaral Gurgel, *Segurança e Democracia: Uma Reflexão Política*, 12nd ed. José Olympio, Rio de Janeiro, 1976.

¹⁵ The important thing is to show how the military and the bourgeoisie perceived the strength of the popular movements in the 1950s and the early 1960s. Whether these movements represented a threat to the capitalist order is a different question.

¹⁶ In this respect I agree with David Lehmann, who argues that the Brazilian military did not possess a clear conception of ideological options that could be translated into a strategy of development. David Lehmann, "Military Organization and the State in Latin America", in *The State and Economic Development in Latin America*, op. cit., p. 188—190.

In the *Manual Básico* of the National War College a chapter is devoted to the definition of National Development.¹⁷ Development and security are inter-linked in the process of achieving National Power, which is expressed at four levels: economic, political, psychosocial and military. Economic development is not seen as an isolated phenomenon but constitutes a part of totality. In the last instance this totality is constituted by a World divided into rich and poor nations (in terms of contemporary economic systems the fundamental division goes: liberal capitalism — Marxist socialism — modern capitalism).¹⁸

In modern capitalism, of which Brazil is an example, the state is to take on a leading role in the economic development process, also with respect to productive functions. State and private initiative complement each other, but it is the increasing state participation that provides the basic orientations and incentives for the private sector.¹⁹

In these considerations on national development there is a basic contradiction between the stressing of individuality (Man in Society; human needs) and the role of the state. A strong government is indispensable for a maximisation of the use of economic resources, which is a prerequisite of national security. This linked with a strategy of internal warfare gives primacy to government in a "militarised state" over a nation of individuals. Questions of welfare, standard of living, etc. are subordinate to the economic needs of a total strategy for achieving National Power. However, this consideration should not lead us to believe that the doctrine of national security — national development has somehow stiffened in the dynamic development of Brazilian capitalism. The Cold-War product has been transformed by societal development.²⁰

The problem with an analysis of ideological manifestations lies in the fact that it does not say very much about actual policies of the military regime or

¹⁷ *Manual Básico*, Escola Superior de Guerra, Departamento de Estudos, Rio de Janeiro 1976. Part IV, chap. 4.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, part I, chap. 4. The conception of Man in Society is essential. It is not denied that socialist countries can achieve material development but it is in contradiction to the basic rights derived from "human condition and dignity". "Houve, é certo, desenvolvimento material nos países socialistas, mas com esquecimento do Homem, como titular de direitos inerentes à condição e à dignidade humanas. Dáí resultam inconformismos de toda a ordem por parte dos componentes do grupo social, que desafiam a implacável repressão do Estado Comunista". *Manual Básico*, p. 142.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 337—348, *passim*. Whether this conception also prevailed in 1964 is difficult to say because a range of revisions have been introduced since then. E.g. with regard to National Power, at least 4 different definitions have been used. In one of these, that introduced in 1971, it is stated explicitly that National Power is achieved in a development process *directed by the state*. *Manual Básico*, p. 258—259.

²⁰ We have to be careful when analysing the relevant documents. They do not always correspond to the present reality, neither to actual policies. One example is General Colberry's *Geopolítica do Brasil*.

how social forces determine such policies. Therefore, military ideology has to be seen in the light of societal development and the way in which class contradictions are reflected in strategy formulations and policy implementation.

The question concerning economic policy and class interests raises a range of issues, but I shall only point at a few examples. The change of regime in 1964 resulted in immediate policies of "stabilisation" that were clearly against the interests of the popular masses. But how did the Brazilian bourgeoisie — who had showed political unity in its support of the coup — react to the economic programme put forward by the military government? When the government presented the Programa de Ação Econômica do Governo, 1964—1966 and created a forum (CONSPLAN) for discussing economic policy, nationalist fractions of the bourgeoisie criticised the proposed strategy. The two main critiques came from the National Confederation of Industry (CNI) and Professor Dias Leite. They expressed concern with a restrictive policy aimed at fighting inflation, arguing that growth could contribute to lowering the rate of inflation.²¹ They saw quite clearly that a restrictive credit policy would result in declining production. Two main points of the critiques were the emphasis of the primacy of national capital over foreign capital (criticising a policy favourable to the inflow of foreign capital) and the need of a clear definition of the role of the public sector. We cannot say that the critique had much effect on economic policy, but when the economy began to accelerate in 1968 and the following years, economic policy had changed and the economic conjuncture presented a different option to national capital.

Another interesting aspect of development strategy is the role of national integration. Given the size of the country it is obvious that Brazil is a special case in Latin America in terms of physical potentials, but here our concern is economic and political aspects. Historically the problems of regional economic and political interests have always played a major role in Brazilian politics. For Vargas the idea of national integration became important for his political thinking and actual policies. For Kubitschek it was a political platform and a basic element of the "developmentalist" ideology. In the 1950s and the 1960s national integration became a dominant feature of economic development strategy, e.g. through the construction of roads and the new projects for development of the North-East. In the late 1960s a new project for the Amazon was presented by the military government.

The Amazon Region presents a huge potential supply of natural resources, but apart from the rubber boomperiod it has never had a significant role in

²¹ Conselho Consultivo do Planejamento (CONSPLAN), *O Debate do Programa de Ação*. Ministério do Planejamento e Coordenação Econômica, Documento de Trabalho no. 3, 1965, p. 20 ff.

the development of the Brazilian economy. When the Amazon project was presented in 1966 there were specific military interests involved (defense of the border and control of internal subversion). However, other aspects seemed to have been just as important. The project served to stress the nationalist character of the military regime. With an increasing opposition against the government (not only from the masses but also from within the bourgeoisie) projects of national integration came to constituting a part of the regime's attempt to passify at least certain factions of the opposition. This was more so when direct economic interests were involved. The National Confederation of Industry saw the Amazon project as a way of extending the internal market and supported the views expressed by some ministers that the development of the region should mainly be preserved for national capital.²² Within the military there were rather differing views on the notion of national integration. President Castelo Branco (1964—67) put forward the "pragmatic" view. For him "pseudo-nationalist attitudes" expressed by the Left and certain fractions of the bourgeoisie meant irrational performance and conduct and were thus opposed to economic development and national security, while real nationalism implied a rational and optimal use of resources for the achievement of National Power.²³ Thus, the question of national or foreign capital was not a relevant issue to discuss when evaluating strategies for national integration. However, other military men supported a different view. General Macedo Soares e Silva, former head of the National Steel Company, in 1966 President of the National Confederation of Industry and Minister of Industry and Trade in the Costa e Silva Government, saw the Amazon project as a way of extending the internal market (referring to the ECLA view) and providing new incentives for national capital under the supervision of the state.²⁴

In general we can say that projects of national integration and regional development have opened up new "space" for private capital in Brazil. However, connected with incentives more favourable towards foreign capital such projects have certainly resulted in a rapid expansion of foreign capital in some areas (e.g. the Free Zone of Manaus, industrial and agricultural projects in the Amazon Region).²⁵ In economic terms national integration has not aimed at substituting internal for external linkages. Rather, it has created new external *and* internal linkages in a process that has strengthened capitalist development. I doubt that an analysis of military ideology can tell us much about this, and I

²² See the book published by the CNI: *A Indústria Brasileira e a Amazônia*, Edição do Serviço Social da Indústria, Rio de Janeiro 1969.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 33—40.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 56—59.

²⁵ For an account of capitalist development in the Amazon see: Fernando H. Cardoso & Geraldo Müller, *Amazônia: Expansão do Capitalismo*. Brasiliense, São Paulo 1977.

also doubt that the Brazilian military has been united in its views on how this development should take place.

My comments on national integration and economic policy have aimed at showing why an analysis of military ideology has to be linked to actual policies and societal development. In this context it is important to see how new conflicts, both within the government and in society as such, arise in the moments of crisis. The early 1970s was characterised by rapid economic growth that also benefited big national-owned industry. At the same time harsh repression eliminated political opposition. When economic problems of inflation and structural imbalances began to surface in 1973—74, this coincided with President Geisel's inauguration year and the general elections in November 1974.²⁶ These political events gave rise to new expectations for political changes, and evidently the constellation of political forces did bring about certain changes in specific areas, but military rule prevailed. The developments of 1976 and 1977 have shown an increasing pressure against the military government, also from sectors within the bourgeoisie, demanding a return to civilian rule. However, to speculate about the outcome of this development is outside the scope of this paper.

When trying to understand the role of the state in contemporary Brazilian capitalist development, it must be remembered that military rule is not a mere question of military ideology and military men in charge of government. It is a much more complex structure of military and civilian bureaucrats acting together, though not unified, within the limits set by social forces in society. It is also a question of the rapid expansion of state-owned industries, sometimes in a direct co-operation with foreign capital, and the growing independence of such industries from the state bureaucracy. Concerning the peculiar role of the Brazilian military and its nationalist character, it is often stressed that one important aspect of its uniqueness lies in a strong tradition for developing managerial and technocratic skills within military institutions.²⁷ I will argue

²⁶ One peculiarity of military rule in Brazil has been the continual process of "reforming" the organisation of elections, the political party system and the role of Congress. The latest alteration of the constitution, which modified electoral procedures in a way that made it virtually impossible for the official opposition party, MDB, to win seats in the Federal Congress or posts as state governors or city mayors, has obliterated what served as a mere democratic facade for military rule.

²⁷ For example: Gabriel Bolaffi, "Brazil: Military State and Vanishing Miracle". *IDS Bulletin*, vol. 9:1, July 1977. The development of a state-owned oil industry is a classical example of how the Brazilian military got involved in enterprise management. Another is the steel industry. The Brazilian army had even its own engineering school which supplied a large proportion of technicians to the Volta Redonda steel plant (see: Werner Baer, *The Development of the Brazilian Steel Industry*. Vanderbilt Univ. Press, Nashville 1969.).

that this tradition has been expressed much more through military management of state-controlled enterprises (steel, oil, electricity, etc.) and state development agencies than through actual policy formulation. It is characteristic that civilian bureaucrats have been in charge of the ministries of finance and planning of the four military governments since 1964. It is also interesting to notice that many top bureaucrats held important posts already in the pre-1964 governments. The outstanding example is, of course, Roberto de Oliveira Campos, Minister of Planning in the Castelo Branco Government, who was Director and then President of the National Bank for Economic Development in the 1950s. The same type of continuity can be found within the establishment of economics professors who have served as advisers to the various governments.

These comments on the role of civilian bureaucrats shall only point at the necessity of analysing the "internal division of labour" of the military governments. To say that military officers occupy all, or almost all, higher posts within the various branches of the state apparatus would be a crude simplification, and it would furthermore make it impossible to single out the specific areas of direct military interest in which strategy and policy formulations are reserved the military institution.