
ALIENATION AND FETISHIZATION:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF “‘RADICALISM AND INNOVATION’ IN THE NEW WORLD GROUP’S APPROACH TO AND REJECTION OF METROPOLITAN INTELLECTUAL AND POLITICAL HEGEMONY”

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I. INTRODUCTION

Part Two

W. Arthur Lewis and New World:
Variations within the Analytic Framework of Neoclassical Economics

Substantively, the broad disagreements between the NWG and W. Arthur Lewis reflected technical rather than fundamental differences, as the main disagreements were internal to neoclassical economic theory. Lewis was aware that imperialism (1870-1945) retarded and/or constrained the space for capital accumulation in the colonies and that it produced and/or intensified economic inequality and limited social transformation in most colonies; however, this was not an original insight. Lewis said, the “backwardness of the less developed countries of 1870 could be changed only by people prepared to alter certain customs, laws, and institutions, and to shift the balance of political and economic power away from the old landowning and aristocratic classes.” He stressed that “the imperial powers ... allied themselves with the existing power blocs. They were especially hostile to educated young people whom, by means of a color bar, they usually kept out of positions where administrative experience might be gained, whether in the public service or in private business.... One result of this was to divert into a long and bitter anti-colonial struggles much brilliant talent which could have been used creatively in development sectors” (Lewis 1978: 214, quoted in Frieden 2006:91; see Girvan 2005; Boulding 1951: 216).

Lewis appreciated the limits of the British laissez-faire doctrine for the colonial territories, and was mindful that the post-1945 world had changed from the accumulation strategies and political arrangements that governed the world between 1870 and 1945 (Blomstrom and Hettne 1984:}

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100-101) and which the Marxist theory of imperialism had explained (see Arrighi 1978). Subjective notions of anti-imperialism such as Lewis’ typically interpreted imperialism as a form of external imposition and domination on colonial and other dependent regions that functions independently of capitalism, seemingly unmindful that such romantic and populist (nationalist) notions contribute little to the search for theoretical clarity about imperialism.

Kari Levitt says, “Sir Arthur Lewis was conservative and pragmatic in temperament, practical in delivering policy advice, but radically anti-imperialist in his conviction that the peoples and societies of the South have the capacity to chart their own path to development.” Substantively, Lewis’ pragmatic anti-imperialist outlook did not transcend his Fabian social democratic orientation. Basically, his moral stand on anti-imperialism was not a substitute for a scientific critique of capitalism, nor was it at variance with a liberal nationalist or anti-communist sentimentalism. According to Levitt, in an “autobiographical note written late in life: he stated: ‘what matters most to growth is to make the best use of one’s own resources and exterior events are secondary’. Trade plays a useful role in development, but ‘countries that hitch their fate to trade are bound to be frustrated’” (Levitt 2005: 5). This approximate state-centric view of the world imagines solitary national states and their economies and equates them to the preferred unit of theoretical analysis.

Jeffrey Frieden argues that the anti-imperialist and anticolonial-antitrade discourse, according to which the “great powers threw the colonies into merciless global economic waters, subjecting poor regions to the constraints of world markets … is misguided.” Frieden says, “the … colonial rulers used restrictions on trade, not free trade, to drain resources from their colonies;” he adds that “engagement with world markets typically increased colonial economic growth dramatically,” stressing that economic stagnation was not restricted to colonies, nor was growth common to all independent countries (Frieden 2006: 92). Capitalist production, trade, and market access reflect the operation of the law of value and express class (power) relations. Contemporary forms of “accumulation by dispossession”, which rely on vigorous extra-economic compulsion and political leverage and war including the U.S. “war on terror”, have become the preferred method for intensifying global integration.

Levitt says, in “the context of ‘globalization’, the teachings of Arthur Lewis present a radical challenge to the developing world to reclaim the right to development - the right to make the best use of one’s own resources …” (2000: 5). What does this moral notion of a radical challenge
represent in terms of power relations? What concrete political options does it afford the working classes around the world? Lewis’ assertion that external events are secondary shows how much he had conflated free trade with restricted trade and how little he appreciated about the limits of post-Keynesian globalization that was transforming the post-war international economy with which the Caribbean was deeply integrated. Broadly, Lewis’ proposal for foreign investment to spearhead Caribbean transformation was consistent with his idea for undermining the “old landowning and aristocratic classes” with which the “imperial powers ... allied themselves....” Lewis anticipated that domestic capital would complement rather than direct international capital, which he saw propelling economic modernization in the Caribbean, so he was emphatic that international capital was indispensable to growth (see Blomstrom and Hettne 1984: 109-110). He did not seem to imagine a necessary national-international dichotomy at work rather he imagined the deepening of the integration of the Caribbean with the international economy to be a historical necessity. Historically, American capitalism, wherever it expanded internationally developed along a different trajectory than western European capitalism: largely, the dominant motif of American direct investment meant imposing the power of science and technology on production.

Levitt says Lewis’ “seminal article on ‘Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour’” (1954) was the result of a brilliant departure from the assumptions of neoclassical economics” (2000: 6). In fact, Lewis’ unlimited supplies of labor (USL) theory approximated an eclectic mix of Ricardian economic conceptions and neo-Weberian dual economy and society theory that requires an apolitical realm free from extra-economic compulsion, a romantic notion in capitalist class societies. Weintraub’s interpretation of Keynesianism as a variant of neo-classical economics suggests that Lewis’s “brilliant departure” was more technical than substantive in relation to the neoclassical paradigm and much less innovative than Levitt might admit. Cumper (1974: 466) says Lewis was eclectic: Lewis integrated Ricardian, Weberian and Keynesian ideas that reflected variations within a general theme. His USL theory, which was grounded in the social dualism of Weberian historical sociology (see Edelman and Haugerud 2005: 12), reflected the same idealist thought that renders history linear and banishes social relations of production or reduces them to epiphenomena. This form of intellectual alienation depicts the world in rich and complex terms, but reduces it to a still frame with things highly illustrated but with people (social class and their contradictory relations) standing motionless in the background (see Holloway 2002: 39-40).
A major problem with Lewis’s USL theory is that in keeping with linear liberal modernization theory it assumed economic backwardness and “underdevelopment” were an original condition that capitalism “gradually eliminates”, with the development of capitalism “emerging” as an “ultimately beneficial and rationalizing influence....” Much like Max Weber who invented capitalism wherever he saw a market, Lewis also assumed that capitalism produces competition market subjects “with no or little role assigned to open or concealed forms of compulsion” that mediate surplus extraction and appropriation (Arrighi 1973: 183), his ideas about the constraints from imperialism notwithstanding. Giovanni Arrighi stresses that the process of extra-economic compulsion “is completed when the gap between productivity in the capitalist sector and productivity in the noncapitalist sector is widened. The process is completed when the gap is so wide that that producers in the latter sector are prepared to sell their labor-time … at whatever wage is consistent with steady accumulation in the capitalist sector.” This is the point at which “the Lewis postulate of the predominance of market mechanisms in the reallocation of labor from the noncapitalist sector to the capitalist sector of the economy becomes realistic” (1973: 214; see Blomstrom and Hettne 1984: 100). Historically, unlimited supplies of labor developed through primitive accumulation mediated by extra-economic compulsion. Lewis produced his USL theory after the anti-colonial rebellion in the BWI in the 1930s that led to the introduction of containment measures of decolonization in conjunction with the modernization of parliamentary government to direct the class struggle into channels that made the deconstruction of European imperialism manageable.

Levitt says, “Lewis was held accountable for the failures of “industrialization by invitation” by a younger generation of UWI economists” and though the “failures were real ... the criticism was misplaced” (2000: 6). In an attempt to rectify the mistake that Levitt attributes to the group of UWI economists and rehabilitate Lewis (see also Social and Economic Studies, Special Number, Vol. 29, No. 4, 1980) Norman Girvan claimed that Lewis’s “anti-imperialist and … nationalist” outlook was conditioned by the transition from “a dying colonial order to a new era of decolonization and national independence.” Girvan says a number of factors shaped Lewis’ moral and intellectual development—his mother’s influence, a meeting he attended with his father “of the local branch of the Marcus Garvey association at ... age seven, and his first hand knowledge of racism which denied him an opportunity to study engineering. Girvan suggests that Lewis’ anti-imperialist credentials were not shaped by a consciousness of the class struggle—i.e. the subjective
factors that he (Girvan) calls “bitterness, or … hate, or … blame” but an anti-imperialism of “self-confidence and self-responsibility” (Girvan 2005). Girvan’s highly subjective and ideological way of connecting the class struggle to “bitterness or hate” approximates a form of intellectual dissembling that fails miserably to rehabilitate Lewis posthumously.

Girvan’s turn to a psychoanalytic notion about the influence of Lewis’ mother does not advance our understanding of his thought. The notion that Lewis’ attendance at a meeting of the “local branch of the Marcus Garvey association at … age seven” reflects an unsuccessful attempt to tether Lewis’s worldview to a romantic form of cultural nationalism. Lewis would have been too young to understand what Garvey himself called the fascist basis of his outlook and that of his movement. Girvan does not address the irrationalist racial authoritarianism that underscored Garvey’s romantic project, nor does he seem to appreciate that the nationalism with which he associates Lewis does not escape the same conundrum of race that white supremacists invoke and deploy to equate blacks to a condition of permanent immaturity. Girvan’s invocation of “black nationalism” to inform his notion of Lewis’ anti-imperialism and nationalism obscures the international dimensions of Lewis’ intellectual contributions. Indeed, Girvan’s way of situating Lewis within the Marcus Garvey moment suggests that his outlook remains trapped by “compensatory inclusion in modernity”, the psychological burden of the “colonial and imperial past” and a romantic yearning for “archaism.” Both white supremacy and “black nationalism” operate in ways that reinforce the alienation of power and block our vision and paths in the direction of the “disalienation of humanity” (Gilroy 2000: 334-35, 352-53).

In drawing Girvan’s attention to fundamental problems with Lewis’ USL thesis, I pointed out that “capitalists are not interested in labor’s creative capacity, only in its productive capacity which is the source of exchange value” (Watson 2005). In contrast with Levitt’s assertion that Lewis’ USL thesis represents a radical break with the neoclassical economic paradigm, Giovanni Arrighi (1973) offers an insightful critique of Lewis USL theory. Arrighi begins with the social relations of production, and follows Marx’s perspective, which warns against the liberal idealist method that banishes social relations from the “act of exchange … between the producers” and equates the social relations between humans to technical relations between things (Marx 1983: 78).

Diana Hunt (1989) locates Lewis’ economic writings within the “expanding capitalist nucleus” (quoted in Benn 2004: 118). Benn counters with the implausible assertion that the highly diverse range and scope of his writings make it “difficult to categorize Lewis’ writings”, by stressing
things that Lewis accepted or rejected. Benn claims “Lewis’ writings represent a monumental contribution to economic theory. He was one of the leading pioneers of development economics which highlighted the peculiar structural characteristics of underdevelopment and advanced prescriptions designed to enable the developing countries to achieve an accelerated pace of development” (2004: 119). Benn fails to appreciate that that all theory and knowledge are for some particular purpose. Lewis’s neo-Ricardian functionalist views on classical and neo-classical laissez-faire conceptions and his neo-Weberian outlook on social problems were evident in his perspective on the nature and role of the external and intervening administrative (neo-Weberian) state, and his notion of imperialism. Benn’s unhelpful notion that it is difficult to categorize Lewis’ writings resonates with the liberal methodology that fragments, fetishizes, externalizes and alienates the state, economy, markets, imperialism, and other categories and reduces them to discrete, static notions. Benn’s anti-historicist historicism is at one with naturalistic materialism.

Lewis’ approach emphasized the modernization of agriculture through a broader industrialization strategy to develop the productive forces of industry and labor to give the BWI capitalists, workers and small farmers a modest industrial base within the international “capitalist nucleus.” His theoretical project and recommendations stressed regional economic integration as an absolute necessity to connect small populations living in very small and scattered islands with limited resources that depended on a largely semi-industrial economic foundation. Ideally, his project anticipated the improvement of skills for the working class away from the mind-numbing drudgery of labor-intensive production. Lewis appreciated that for Caribbean labor to become internationally competitive, the workers would have to integrate more closely with the international economy and acquire internationally competitive technical skills, which meant subjecting their labor power to more intense exploitation under post-war international standards. Lewis was aware that Caribbean plantation and commercial interests had few links with modern science, technology, and research and development (R&D) on a scale to develop the productive forces of labor and industry on a competitive basis, so he stressed foreign investment. He emphasized closer integration with international capitalism, with attention to access to imported technology and export markets.

Guglielmo Carchedi raises important questions about Ricardo’s theory that carry implications for Lewis’ USL theory. Carchedi discusses labor productivities between branches that Ricardo addressed, and argues that the emphasis ought to be on labor productivities within branches that make meaningful comparisons possible. Carchedi says Ricardo’s
preoccupation with geographical comparisons led him to externalize international labor productivity. He insists that Ricardo would have done better to compare productivities within branches by comparing the labor in wine with wine and the labor in textiles with textiles rather than compare countries with countries, in order to demystify the law of value in light of the geographical spatial organization of commodity production. The point is that capitalists operate spatially by moving between branches within and across geographical areas via foreign investment and other initiatives to rationalize production and improve profitability rather than to save on social labor (Carchedi 1991: 220) and/or to avoid “tariff barriers” (see Agnew 2005: 86).

Carchedi says Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantages “hides the existence of unequal exchange and … hides the greater advantage which accrues to the dominant capitalists in the imperialist countries from the reproduction of technological underdevelopment in the dominated countries” (1991: 220). Carchedi analyzes the “inconsistency” of comparative advantages theory “with capitalist reality” (1991: 220) and discusses labor productivities between branches of industry and production, avoiding the mistake that marks Ricardo’s state-centric way of treating competition as competition between countries. He questions the notion that “when different branches are compared, labor-saving techniques beget higher profitability…” and concludes, “Ricardo’s comparative advantages can explain neither international specialization nor international prices. This theory is a non-starter” (1991: 220). Lewis followed Ricardo’s prescription under static comparative advantages based on state-centric (geographical) assumptions.

The “principle of comparative advantages” and its achievements have made it “difficult to imagine a more powerful argument in favor of England’s specialization in manufacture and of Portugal’s specialization in agriculture (raw material) products” (Carchedi 1991: 219). The British state and leading capitalist strata forced producers in countries like Portugal into agricultural (raw materials) specialization by an economic process whose workings necessitated forms of extra-economic compulsion and diplomacy. The Ricardian theory of comparative advantages does not only mask unequal exchange it also benefits the international capitalist strata through “the reproduction of technological underdevelopment in the dominated countries” (Carchedi 1991: 220; see Frieden 2006: 92). NWG economists were familiar with this fact, which they equated to dependence.

Rex A. McKenzie seems to find parallels in Lewis’ *Industrialization of the British West Indies (1949)* that Levitt found in his USL theory. McKenzie says Lewis (’1949) made a “decisive break with the colonial...
design which assigns the West Indian islands to supplying raw materials and domiciling surplus labour” (McKenzie 2005: 1). Lewis’ insight came from his appreciation of the empirical world, which revealed that the historical trajectory had already shifted against classical imperialism in the direction of postwar capitalist internationalization. The idea of a decisive break with the “colonial design” has to connect with the disintegration of imperialism or it must fail to appreciate the specificity of the postwar moment. Lewis differed with the neoclassical analytic structure on technical grounds when he defended the humanistic premise of employing “a man so long as the value of what he produces exceeds the cost of the raw materials, machinery and other services which cooperate with him in production” (Lewis 1949: 42-43). It is questionable that he saw this option as a long-term solution to the problem of capital accumulation in the Caribbean. Karl Polanyi and others had made a similar point (see Levitt 2005). Broadly, Lewis’s support for an activist role for the state resonated with post-war Keynesian and broader social democratic prescriptions and he was fully aware that the United Nations and the World Bank were supporting indicative (development) planning in the colonies (Watson 1975). As a social democrat, Lewis imagined subordinating the accumulation requirements of capital to the social objectives and imperatives of national societies, a tendency the international capitalist forces surreptitiously undermined along with the social and economic architecture of neo-Keynesianism (Schiller 1998).

Lewis rejected the dialectical method of historical periodization in favor of a linear interpretation of history that led him to view the West as the mirror image for the colonial world. He said, "We do not believe that there are stages of development through which every society must pass, from primitive stages through feudalism to exchange economies. All our prediction is on the much more pedestrian level of enquiring how far the changes which occurred in the wealthier countries as they developed may be expected to repeat themselves in poorer countries if they develop” (quoted in McKenzie 2005: 1). Lewis’s criticism was applicable to the linear view of history that is central to naturalistic materialism, which is incompatible with the Marxist concept of periodization, which does not remove any societies from the normal course of history by banishing them to empty or emptiable (timeless or meaningless) sites. Characteristically, liberal (linear) modernization theory constructed a static dual society model of modern and traditional societies within the same historical moment at great cost to the advance of theoretical knowledge.

Substantively, the industrialization experience of the West benefited from extensive primitive accumulation on a world scale around colonial
expropriation of abundant lands with vast quantities of raw materials, the “American Holocaust”, African slave labor, Asian indentured labor, and numerous other advantages that included access to labor supplies way below the cost of their social reproduction. The European agricultural revolution, large-scale rural-urban migration within Europe, and very large population flows to the Americas were other specific beneficial features of the European experience that also contributed peculiar gifts to the historical development of the United States (see Amin 1997: ix). It is unhelpful to talk about the prospects of poorer countries repeating the “changes which occurred in the wealthier countries as they developed …” under conditions in which those options were not open to them for exploitation.

Especially after World War II, the US and European powers whose colonial empires were decomposing, relied on the Caribbean Commission (CC) as one mechanism to intensify the integration of the Caribbean with the American political economy via an unfolding multilateralist (hegemonic) strategy. The “Puerto Rican Model” (PRM) strategy (see Rivera Guzman 2005) was a way to deepen the integration of Puerto Rico and the Caribbean with postwar international capitalism and manage the deconstruction of European imperialism in more or less predictable ways. NWG nationalist ideology interpreted this shift as import substitution industrialization (industrialization by invitation) and dependence¹ (see Watson 1975; Blomstrom and Hettne 1984: 100). The overall result has been that “the entanglement effected by trade, investment, narcotics and migration flows, refugees, remittances, communications, education, and military and security processes across state boundaries in this part of the world is now so extensive that one can speak of the emergence of a conjoined political economy best described as ‘Caribbean America’” (Payne 2003: 157, emphasis added) that reflects the achievements of U.S. hegemony in the Caribbean.

Lewis’ recommendations also carried implications for the role of British capitalism that had dominated export production and trade in the BWI, as witnessed by the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement and other neomercantilist strategies. British capitalists and Whitehall viewed with great concern the growing challenge from American capitalism in the BWI. From around 1950, Whitehall and British capitalists failed to convince the BWI decolonizing elite that American investors did not understand West Indian culture and institutions like the British. The American strategy proved effective, as the gradual economic and technological displacement of British economic influence in the BWI and beyond by the American ruling class intensified the post-war decline of Britain.
In 1966, four years after Jamaica became independent Whitehall lamented Jamaica’s decision to award contracts to American firms at the expense of British contractors. R. G. Britten, an analyst with the Colonial Office lamented that the “British Government had contributed some £60,000 towards the basic planning carried out by the R.R.L. team [Road Research Laboratory Team]” with the expectation that “British firms would stand a very good chance of getting the consultancy work. But despite lobbying on our behalf including an informal talk between the Minister of State in the C.R.O. and Mr. Sangster, the Acting Prime Minister, the contract for the first of these substantial projects has been awarded to an American firm.” Speaking for Whitehall, Britten said, “We therefore see no reason to bend over backwards to provide further guidance to the Jamaicans on the work done by the R.R.L. team, particularly if this advice will be used to benefit non-British firms.” He opined, “If there were firm indications that the Jamaicans intended to award the next main consultancy contract to a British firm, we should of course see no objection” to investing time and resources to visit Jamaica; however, he reiterated standing “by our objections to the visit taking place.”

Implicit in the NWG economic analysis is the notion that the real economy is a national economy. NWG criticism of “foreign capital” and external domination masked their idealization and fetishization of the “metropolitan” economy, which they equated to the way an autocentric (real) economy should work. In Persistent Poverty, Beckford conceded that he left himself open to the charge of “over-generalization and under-documentation”, asserting that Persistent Poverty (1972) was “an ‘ideas’ book” and the Caribbean needed "studies pregnant with ideas, not studies full of sterile detail” because ideas “help people to understand problems and to pursue further inquiry.” Beckford’s notion of an “ideas book” smacks of a populist appeal to commonsense in line with his assertion that “a ‘peoples’ scholar” must “mobilize popular opinion in order to effect change” (Beckford; 1972: v). We must ask what happens if the omission of “sterile details” makes it impossible for the “people” to grasp the full scope and complexity of the reality they are being mobilized to change. Beckford does not explain how “over-generalization and under-documentation” serve the “people’s” interest and why a “people’s” scholar should sacrifice theoretical rigor and empirical adequacy in the pursuit of inquiry in the “people’s” interest. He did not explain how his methodology contributed to a clear understanding of the spatial organization of capitalist production. Beckford substituted populist nationalism for theoretical and empirical rigor in ways that resonated with the ways Best subordinated praxis to objective idealism, with his notion that “thought is action …” (see Mars
1998: 122), a clear sign of the alienation and fetishization of thought. Beckford’s radicalism contrasted with Best’s more conservative disposition.

Best dedicated Tapia House in Trinidad to the voluntarist notion that with the creation of a “cultural revival, a moral resurgence … all the rest will follow in economics and politics, in education and sport.” Best’s ideas remained trapped in sentimental pragmatism: he suggested that each movement and organization that emerges with a view toward the transformation of society, as in the imagination of the 1970 Black Power uprising in Trinidad and Tobago “must be reinforced by its own thought and … informed by its own ideas” (quoted in Mars 1998: 122). Best’s indebtedness to neo-Weberian sociological thought requires carefully analysis. Lewis’ indebtedness to neo-Weberian historical sociology is evident in the way he equated historical analysis to a taxonomic framework that blocks our vision to history as a “dialectical totality in motion.” Best is no less beholden to similar theoretical conceptions that imagine the sum of the parts to be greater than the whole!

II. THE INTERNAL RELATION OF THE CAPITALIST STATE WITH GLOBAL CAPITALISM: TRANSCENDING NATIONALIST FETISHIZATION AND ALIENATION

Liberal democratic state theories stress constitutional notions of power that alienate the “state from its social environment by attributing to the state … autonomy of action that it just does not have” from the capital relation. The capitalist state is a set of institutions that constitute one aspect of a complex of social relations that must be understood in terms of the “organization of work, production, social reproduction and accumulation.” In other words, the state is part of the “system of capitalist organization” which means the “specific historical relationship of the state to capitalism is internal” (Holloway 2002: 32-33). The modern state-capital can be traced to the capitalist infrastructure of imperialism “… triad of governments, intergovernmental organizations, and corporations …” dating back to “colonial regimes….” (Pieterse 2004: 32-33). In light of the reality of the transnationally constituted capital relation, the real social environment of the capitalist state is the heterogeneous global environment (see Robinson 2004).

In order to appreciate the limits of state-centric thinking and to grasp the significance of the globally constituted capital relation it is necessary to free “capitalist relations from … territorial strictures” while “grasping them and the national states as indispensable elements of a ‘global web.’” Nationalist conceptions of the state fetishize sovereignty, conflate it with
self-determination, and blend “nationalism with anti-capitalism … when … the very existence of the state as a form of social relations is the very antithesis of self-determination” (Holloway 2002: 14, 15, 16). Substantively, sovereignty is a historically specific expression of bourgeois property relations whose existence depends on necessity because the law of value on which capital accumulation rests shapes the environment of juridical sovereign statehood. The tendency to fetishize self-determination by equating it to the deontological notion of freedom from colonial control contributes to confusion. Substantively, self-determination must transcend bourgeois necessity and the law of value to equate to substantive freedom: freedom from necessity is unrealizable in a world divided into national states that treat power as a coveted organic factor that those very states are compelled to accumulate at the expense of one another, more or less.

Under capitalism, the foremost responsibility of those exercising state power by ruling at home and abroad is not the development of the national society as an end in itself rather it is to provide the most favorable conditions for the expansion and reproduction of globally constituted capital. The national spaces within which capitalist organization, production, and accumulation take place are integral parts of the transnational capitalist order. Transnational capital, the leading capitalist states, the multilateral institutions, and globally integrated business strata in the Third World have been working aggressively to deepen the integration of national states with the global movement of capital. This shift also makes it more difficult for any national government to set national priorities at variance with the imperatives of the process of global capital accumulation.

The tendency among nationalists to fetishize sovereignty by conflating it with self-determination and tracing its national features to organic derivatives misrepresents the internal nature of the state-capital relation. As functionalists, nationalists do not appreciate that sovereignty expresses the internal relation of the capitalist state with global capitalism and in this regard, they seem impervious to the reality of the alienation of sovereignty and state power from civil society under capitalism. The internal relation of the state with capitalism does not stem form the functions that state agents perform; however, social democrats and other nationalists like Girvan (see Girvan 2005) derive the nature of the state from the state’s functions, thereby adding to confusion about the nature of the state, its relationship to capital and social classes, and its location within the social relations of production. Kari Levitt seems to discern this problem: she says, the “contradictions between the requirements of the capitalist economy for unlimited expansion and the requirements of people
to live in mutually supportive relations cannot be resolved without a civilization change to transform institutions governing economic life. This is a long-term process, but in the history of humanity, the past two centuries of industrial capitalism are a moment…. The transformation of the capitalist order requires a new calculus of the value of work, the value of human needs and the value of nature …” (Levitt 2005). Dialectically, global capitalist integration strengthens the foundations for a global culture; however, this process unfolds in keeping with capitalist needs around the violent attraction and repulsion of labor on a global scale. The civilization change of which Levitt speaks is impossible without labor ceasing to produce surplus labor, which is capital.

Nationalists separate the economy, state, economics, and politics into discrete sites where social relations between people become technical relations mediated by “things.” In many respects, NWG nationalists privileged populism, which turns out to work against the long-term interests of the working class. In the context of the BWI/CARICOM countries, the notion of anti-imperialism has functioned in patently ideological ways to politicize and mobilize along populist lines without a capacity for sustainable struggle. Conceptually, anti-imperialism contributes little to our understanding of the nature of globally constituted capitalism. Nationalists try to nationalize the bourgeoisie by misrepresenting its structurally embedded relationship with global capitalism as contingent and voluntary. Across the ideological spectrum, nationalists view globalization as a threat to national culture (Lamming 2003) and they complicate interpretations of social reality by conflating neo-Herderian (communitarian) sentiments about national identity with anti-capitalist accounts of anti-globalization.

In the real world, no social class strata can effectively reproduce themselves in isolation from the globalized economy. NWG nationalists contributed to contemporary forms of ideological dissembling that suggest the possibility of nationalizing economic and social life and rolling back the borders of cultural imperialism to achieve cultural self-determination, perhaps to recuperate sovereign decision-making power that has shifted to the world level. Cultural nationalists also believe that the “the nation can always function as an imaginary community that compensates for the lack of real liberty or equality of its members” (Anderson 2001). Of course, romantic cultural nationalism (the ideology of the communitarian nation), and political nationalism (the ideology of the territorial civic nation) do not exist in a binary fashion. Marxist organizations and movements such as trade unions and political parties have long been penetrated by cultural nationalism, openly or surreptitiously: even where Marxist organizations...
have tended to repudiate race and cultural nationalism they functioned as sites of cultural nationalist or even racist prejudices (see Benn 2004: 213-14; Anderson 2001).

Post-World War II BWI anti-colonial nationalism contrasted with Enlightenment rationalism, which routinely “pitted reason against tradition, a conscious collective will against the inert weight of customs.” Part of the problem with romantic nationalism is that it replaces the rationalist impulse within political nationalism with Herderian notions of culture that privilege the “incarnation of a particular ethnic, linguistic or racial identity” (Malik 1996: 137). Rupert Lewis (1998: 105) does not escape the seduction of neo-Herderian romanticism, which develops on the mystical premise of an endless “accumulation of religious, linguistic, and genealogical identity references” (Balibar 2004: 5).

Perry Anderson (2001) says the first attempt at a substantive project in universalist internationalism was the rise of the “revolutionary struggles for socialism, announced by the Communist Manifesto.” The leading forces in the revolutionary struggle of the first International Workingmen’s International comprised a largely pre-industrial “artesunate” that was highly literate and geographically, territorially, and culturally mobile, and its members shared a strong sense of social solidarity. BWI nationalism demonstrated no critical appreciation of this differentiated (universalist) internationalism, given its ideological roots in English racial Anglo-Saxonism and considering, for example, the way the colonial political elite and most of the intelligentsia sided with Britain and the US against Cheddi Jagan and the majority of the fledgling Guianese working class from the 1950s. The Anglo-American Cold War served as the incubus for BWI territorial chauvinism, which also compounded the crisis of the West Indies Federation and privileged ethnic notions of nationhood in anticipation of national independence. Almost without exception across the BWI the decolonizing elite adopted the exclusionary (communitarian) principle of belonging found in the liberal concept of sovereignty and the sovereign community, the refuge of which are forms of exclusion and violence that shape the sense of political identity in the modern nation state.

The struggle for universal adult suffrage and decolonization in the BWI emphasized national particularism in putative anti-imperialist discourses. The prevailing material and subjective conditions did little to undermine religious obscurantism, anti-communism, and the racialization of ethnicity. The material backwardness of the capitalist strata was evident in their distance from modern science, technology, production and research and development (R&D). The absence of R&D institutions to improve production techniques, the pervasiveness of low labor productivity, and the
weakness of progressive cultural and educational institutions to deepen the socialization of the experiences of workers had a profound impact. The Anglo-American anti-communist and anti-working class Cold War project filled the vacuum in an environment in which the largely semi-industrial BWI working class came to party politics and parliamentary government (see Hart 2004: 102-121).

English racial Anglo-Saxonism (Horsman 1981) had operated like a subterranean force in helping to shape the contours of BWI nationalist ideology. The idea of the British Empire as the highest expression of moral freedom and world diversity connected with Christianity and the British Crown, and contributed to a shared sense among British citizens and the mass of colonized subjects that the British Empire functioned according to the workings of Divine Providence and natural law (see Lamming 1953: 67, 68). As the post-war world convulsed in a state of ferment around the struggle by the “exploited and destitute masses, in an intercontinental revolt against western colonialism and imperialism” (Anderson 2001), Whitehall, the British Trade Union Congress (TUC) and British Labor Party intensified their efforts to steer the BWI decolonization process through parliamentarization as a form of cold war containment. The US exploited the myriad contradictions that merged within this process to restructure the postwar world and achieve hegemony on an increasingly complex multilateral foundation.

Contextually, the Cold War project annexed the social sciences (Morton and Bilgin 2002) with the effect of strengthening the ideological props of modernization theory and realigning decolonization, nation-building, and postcolonial sovereignty with the postwar American hegemonic offensive. The American strategy cultivated multilateralism on the infrastructures of what Arrighi calls “multinational enterprise capitalism”, which also signaled the transition from the historical reality that Lenin’s theory of imperialism described (Arrighi 1978). Multilateralism framed the articulation of the postwar historical structure. The US conducted high- and low-intensity warfare against third world nationalisms partly to secure conditions favorable for deepening the internationalization of capital. Integrating colonial and other third world trade unions with the Cold War project was essential to the American strategy, around which most of the BWI trade unions and decolonizing elite readily gravitated. The multilateralist strategy of the American ruling class also intensified the global constitution of force through the internationalization of the highly violent and militarized U.S. national security apparatuses. A thin version of neo-Keynesianism (see Kiely 2005)
provided the appropriate problem-solving policy framework in conjunction with the Bretton Woods institutions.

The American ruling class exploited multilateralism to solidify its transnational hegemonic base. It is unhelpful to treat American imperialism as permanent (linear) fixture across time and space. The U.S. ruling class has effectively transcended nation and territorial boundaries in order to rule transnationally, promoting bourgeois liberty under liberal capitalism with forms of violence that reflect the global constitution of force as a central mediating factor. Broadly, the American ruling class has relied on the strategic deployment and use of force to secure the conditions for the expansion of capitalism and associated geopolitical imperatives, not merely in the interest of American capitalists but on behalf of capitalism. The U.S. geopolitical priorities have consistently reflected the priorities of expanding the territorial scope of capital accumulation (Robinson 2004; Agnew 2005).

Nationalists discover imperialism wherever they see international domination, so they impose the logic of empire on hegemony. The postwar American-led strategy also integrated the state, multinational corporations, and the new multilateral institutions (UN, IMF, World Bank, GATT and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in a new arrangement. This was the context in which the US state and the former European imperial powers shared responsibility, financed the operations, and redefined the terms of inter-capitalist competition: the American ruling class became hegemonic in the new dispensation.  

During the early period of the Cold War, as the US state and international capital intensified their attack on the working classes and peasants around the world, certain fractions of the capitalist strata in the colonies and neocolonies entered into alliances of convenience with populist-nationalist politicians, expecting those alliances would afford ways to shelter their operations from international competition. Of course, where some of those capitalist interests assumed independence would contribute to the development of “national” capitalism they never made national development their priority because private capital accumulation, which is a global process, remained their primary concern. The end of the Cold War, the deepening of the integration of the former Soviet bloc, and China and the national liberation countries with capitalism found the ruling classes in those areas to be eager participants in the business of shifting key areas of national decision making to the world level. This is where the global movement of capital is most decisive, and has been a key aspect of the production of post-imperialist hegemony.

The US led the offensive with Taft-Hartley Act (1947), the National Security Act (1947) that created the Central Intelligence Agency, and
McCarthyism, all of which were instrumental in framing the Truman Doctrine of containment and counterrevolution within the US and abroad. In 1948, George Kennan, the architect of the U.S. cold war policy, dismissed as idealistic and “talk about vague and unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of living standards and democratization ….” Kennan asserted that it was “better to have a strong regime in power than a liberal government if it is indulgent and relaxed and penetrated by Communists” (George Kennan February 1948, quoted in Landau 1988: 33; see Hoogvelt 2001: 246). Two of the important lessons we learn from Kennan’s statement are that domination and consent are integral the production of hegemony in relation to geopolitics and the expansion of capitalism. Contextually, the state shares an internal relation with capitalism and is indispensable for securing favorable conditions for the expansion of capitalism.

Washington’s multilateralist strategy reflected the dominant position the US ruling class had acquired, and which it used to manage and regulate multilateralism in conjunction with the financial, military-strategic, political, and other advantages it acquired. The US was in a strategic position to subordinate and integrate its main European class allies whose empires were rapidly disintegrating. The U.S. military occupation of Europe was instrumental in shoring up the far flung class interests of the European bourgeoisie at home and abroad, and the American control of NATO, the World Bank, the IMF, the OECD, GATT, the United Nations Security Council and cold war anti-communism reflected the subordination of the international bourgeois strata to American-style multilateralism. American-mediated multilateralism does not equate to the imperialism of the 1870s-1945, nor did it translate readily into a “genuinely transnational governance which would be above the interests of particular nation-states” (Kiely 2005: 90) and their ruling classes. The U.S. strategy for intensifying the expansion of international capitalism involved accepting international competition with American capitalists, and the US state: American capitalist strata cooperated with other capitalist classes to deepen internationalization based on asymmetrical power trajectories. Historical structures take shape around material and social forces and processes as well as ideational strategies (Bilgin and Morton 2002, Agnew 2005).

The global spatial organization of capitalism connects with the national organization of political power and rule in capitalist societies. Substantively, state power, class, and nation transcend national borders and are best theorized beyond the limits of the nation-state and juridical sovereign identity. Political parties and labor unions in the Caribbean politicize and mobilize publics and electorates on the material foundations
of capitalism: the politicians and technocrats use state power to attract portions of international capital to Caribbean shores to produce exchange value for the ends of capital accumulation. To suggest the nationality of capital can determine the social content of international capital is to impose nationalist consciousness on reality. Large-scale remittances to Caribbean societies from North America and Europe attest to the integration of diverse categories of workers from the Caribbean with their North American and European counterparts: remittances (see Mishra 2006) continue to protect several governments and societies in the Caribbean from potential social implosion.

Leading capitalist strata across the Caribbean continue to form strategic alliances with the transnational capitalist strata: the integration of the postcolonial state with the global movement of capital is a highly complex and advanced process. Unable to counter the intensification of globalization via the formation of strategic transnational (corporate) alliances, and the integration of the national state with the global movement of capital, Caribbean nationalists assert that “cultural imperialism” threatens national “cultural sovereignty” with undoing (Lamming 2003). In their desperate attempt to mummify culture, they conflate their romantic notions of national culture with identity. In the process, they do not only banish subjectivity, which lies at the heart of our universal humanism, they also expose their alienation. Cultural relativism is a reflection of the failure to appreciate our “differentiated universality.” Nationalists scarcely appreciate the extent to which the colonial and imperial past continues to bind them to “outmoded principles of differentiation” in the face of challenges to the myths of blood, race, culture, heritage, and other elusive symbols (Gilroy 2000: 334-35).

Nationalists do not simply rupture the integral relationship between nature and culture; they subsume culture under nature by objectifying and romanticizing nature, and they render culture mystical and incommensurable in ways that underscore their romantic urges (see Lewis 1998 passim). Fanon states unambiguously that culture defies all attempts at naturalization and totalization, “abhors all simplification” and does not thrive on the “translucidity of custom” because in “its essence it is opposed to custom for custom is always the deterioration of culture. The desire to attach oneself to tradition or bring abandoned traditions to life … does not only mean going against the current of history but also opposing one’s people” (Fanon 1968: 180, 37-39, 87, 166-71). The concept of the global constitution of capitalism does not mean that capitalism’s globality equates to totality because totality is a dialectical process rather than an outcome (Holloway 2002). The power of capital is concentrated where the
transnational state is most highly developed, consistent with the economic, financial, and political unevenness within capitalism.

**III. Crisis of Development Theory, the Rise of Post-Development Ideology and Global Capitalist Crisis**

The history of capitalist expansion is the history of production for private capital accumulation of which uneven development is a byproduct. Post-war liberal modernization (sociology of development) literature equated capital accumulation to national economic development guided by national states. Modernization discourse fostered the neo-Keynesian impression of the state as a technical administrative entity that is external to capitalist relations of production, an entity that voluntarily intervenes in the economy to correct economic and social contradictions of modernizing societies.

By the late 1960s and early 1970s, widespread disappointment had set in regarding the achievements of the modernization and national development experience in the Third World; however, there were broader systemic problems that highlighted the crisis of the Bretton Woods arrangements that mirrored the disintegration of the postwar (cold war) historical structure (see Hoogvelt 2001; Berger 2001). Jamaica and Trinidad were the first to reveal associated contradictions in the West Indies. The net transfer of wealth from Third World workers, small farmers, and peasants to national and international capitalists is associated with the chronic indebtedness that Third World workers and peasants shoulder. This reality engendered pessimism among development scholars, many of whom turned to poststructuralist post-development discourses that stress Foucauldian notions of “capillary” power (see Edelman and Haugerud 2005: 155-187 passim) that reflect little understanding of the organization and workings of capitalism.

Broadly, NWG social scientists approached foreign investment from an ideological perspective in suggesting that its first priority should be the creation of jobs rather than the accumulation of capital, which is the very basis for its existence. They fostered the impression that national criteria could delimit the global spatial organization of capitalist production. International investors set up light manufacturing enterprises in the Caribbean to take advantage of incentives and other benefits that helped them to achieve temporary competitive advantage in North American markets. The Anglo-American Cold War project forced BWI trade unions to withdraw from the WFTU and join the ICFTU, partly to keep wages in line with the requirements of the internationalization of capital into areas
with low techno-industrial infrastructures. This move was part of a larger strategy for managing decolonization in more or less predictable ways.

The so-called innovative labor-intensive technology that NWG recommended did not stand a chance of sustaining the competitiveness of Caribbean workers in a world where the world gross national product (GNP) rose by over 2,300 percent from $1.3 trillion (1960) to $30 trillion (late 1990s). During the same period in the “Third World,” world school enrollment increased by 50 percent, creating millions of new entrants to the international labor force. Life expectancy increased by 17 years and child mortality declined by 50% worldwide. Between “1950 and 1990, as the world’s population doubled so too did the number of people living in poverty.” The World Bank estimates that if the $2 per day standard is used the actual number of people living in abject “poverty increased from 2.4 billion to 2.7 billion between 1987 and 2001” (Edelman and Haugerud 2005: 8-9; see Kiely 2005: 107-09). More to the point labor intensive production does not require a highly literate, skilled labor force, rather it tends to favor one mired in obscurantism and cultural backwardness, which would compound problems for the working class where a large relative surplus population exists.

During the same period, global economic inequality increased dramatically, as captured in the following statistics: “in 1960 the wealthiest 20 percent of the world’s population received 30 times the income of the poorest 20 percent; in 1997 the richest 20 percent received 74 times as much…. By the late 20th century, the world’s 200 wealthiest individuals had assets equal to more than the combined income of 41 percent of the world’s population…. Debt levels as a percentage of export earnings in poor nations doubled between 1970 and 1986, and by 1986 more money flowed to the West in debt repayments than went to the Third World in loans and investments” (Edelman and Haugerud 2005: 9). Extra-economic compulsion, though not necessarily the decisive factor in capitalist social relations of production, which reflect the differentiation of state and market, still played an important role in depressing wages in many parts of the Third World. Notably, governments in East Asia, for example, intensified the development of the productive forces of industry and labor in pursuit of global competitiveness, a process in which extra-economic repression played a large role. Caribbean capital and labor are yet to achieve price and wage competitiveness with Low Wage Asia.

Stephen Gill (2003) and John Holloway (2002) explain why post-structuralist post-development discourses of power (and power relations) do not provide helpful accounts of the so-called development problem including when we add inequality and poverty to the equation (see Pieterse
Gill says, missing from Foucault’s analysis of the “epistemological revolution is any sustained analysis of the rise of capital as a social formation, and indeed any attempt to speak of its power either specifically or in general. Missing also is a discussion of historical struggle over the modalities of power and knowledge.” Global capitalist restructuring based on the globalization of high technology production involves the large-scale destruction of certain forms of physical capital and labor power and the concentration of wealth at one pole and the devaluation of living labor that contributes to dramatic increases in inequality, poverty and destitution at the other. Foucault’s followers seem inattentive to the “overwhelming evidence of tremendous growth of inequality…” to bring “an emancipatory dimension to this perspective in so far as there is no adequate link between macro- and micro-structures of power in the approach.” Gill stresses that in contrast, “historical materialism goes much further in an attempt to theorize and to promote collective action to create an alternative form of society… This is why it is necessary to theorize the problem of change in local and global dimensions and to look beyond the currently fragmented forms of opposition to neo-liberal supremacy” (Gill 2003: 121, 122, 123). Gill’s analysis carries implications for the ways Foucauldian notions of power and resistance subordinate subjectivity to alienated and fetishized notions of identitarian micro-politics.

John Holloway offers an incisive critique of Foucault’s notion of power in relation also to subjectivity and identity. Holloway says Foucault stresses the importance of thinking about power in terms of a “multiplicity of force relations” (Foucault 1990: 92; Holloway 2002: 38) and embeds, even naturalizes resistances within power rendering power discursively ubiquitous and causing the two to seem mutually constitutive. Foucault’s analysis of the “richness and complexity of power relations in contemporary society” fetishizes discourse—“talking … language”—and reduces complexity and richness to the “richness of a still photograph, or of a painting. There is no movement in the society that Foucault analyzes; change from one still photograph to another but no movement.” Foucault’s analysis provides “a whole host of resistances which are integral to power but there is no possibility of emancipation. The only possibility is an endlessly shifting constellation of power-and-resistance.” Foucault’s neo-Weberian notion of capillary power offers no path to the disalienation of power or the disalienation of humanity, settling instead for flattening and externalizing capitalist social relations and reducing political economy to a mass of scattered signs. In contrast, in Marxist theory, “subjectivity is the negation of identity” however the failure of poststructuralist theory to
appreciate this critical difference leads proponents to fetishize identity by disguising their attack on subjectivity (Holloway 2002: 39-40, 70, 71).

At the level of appearances, NWG thinkers seemed to defend the interest of workers in their defense of “innovative” labor-intensive production techniques; however, on closer examination it becomes clear that this retrograde move, which separated capital’s need for labor from labor’s productiveness—a clear sign of how naturalistic materialists misunderstand the dialectical nature of the relationship of manual labor to mental labor—approximated a fetishistic attempt to confuse production of exchange value with subsistence production. Contextually, NWG seemed not to appreciate that complex labor-saving technology increases the rate of exploitation from which we cannot hope to separate increases in the productivity of labor under capitalism. In keeping with naturalistic materialist ideology, NWG perceived technology as the expression of a technical relation between things in which the alienating power of science and industry seemed to conspire to negate labor’s subjectively. NWG thought ruptured the integral capital-wage labor relation as seen in the writings by Girvan, Jefferson, Beckford, Best and others, and ignored the fact that technology is a social form and an instrument capitalists and the state employ to wage class struggle.

Historically, across the spectrum of economic activity, peasants and workers of all stripes have yearned for ways to overcome the mind-numbing, health-endangering and physically brutal forms of labor, which means fighting for their labor power to be more highly exploited: labor’s social value to capital is a function of its ability to produce exchange value on increasingly sophisticated terms. Under capitalism, the productiveness of labor contains within itself the seeds of both its own domination and repulsion by capital because labor’s own social reproduction anticipates the production of capital, which is labor’s opposite. It is within this dialectic that the possibility exists for labor to cease producing capital; however, the intensification of the capital-wage labor relation is essential to the realization of that possibility which the discourse of resistance does not seem to appreciate.

The postwar scientific and technological revolution rested on the expansion and intensification of capital intensive production. NWG economists were aware of this shift; however, the economists approached this changing reality in a highly subjective manner, having regarded advanced technology with suspicion. George Beckford, for example, viewed the Caribbean economy from an angle of production for subsistence, as was reflected in his tendency to romanticize the “peasantry”, which is a highly questionable category in relation to the
concrete conditions of Commonwealth Caribbean political economy. Beckford claimed the plantation sector undermined the development of the peasantry (Beckford 1972: 196; Benn 2004: 139) as though the peasantry develops with the intensification of capitalism. Beckford’s tendency to romanticize the peasantry rested on naturalistic materialist sentimentalism which separates manual labor from and mental labor, and equates change to adaptation to the past. Beckford seemed to imagine a bifurcated world of capitalist production and peasant production in which the real peasantry struggles to subvert plantation (capitalist) production to achieve substantive freedom based on the perpetuation of petty commodity and subsistence production.

In contrast, W. Arthur Lewis’ USL theory anticipated the proletarianization of the peasantry that he equated to a linear process free from extra-economic compulsion, a rather romantic naturalistic notion, indeed! Still, Lewis’ USL theory was at least mindful in a linear sense of the deepening of the postwar international socialization of capitalist production, a process that also intensified rural-urban migration, drew large numbers of women into modern production, including the women from the Caribbean that migrated to Britain and North America. Lewis’ USL theory did not create the process rather it recognized the contradictory mode of postwar economic transformation. Considering that very large numbers of women in CARICOM countries are the heads of households, the NWG vision for labor-intensive production also would work against the progression of the interest of working class women.

The development of the productive forces made it possible for increasing numbers of women to move into industrial employment and in modern services and professional employment, the opportunity costs associated, with education, training, family, childcare and other areas considered. However, very large numbers of West Indian workers possessed only basic education and at best marginal skills that did not equip them to function in highly complex industries. Emigration was decisive in the restructuring of the labor force in the postwar Caribbean and Caribbean women from different social class strata have played a strategic role in producing so-called Caribbean transnational families within international and global capitalism. Universal adult suffrage in the BWI, formal legal equality, and social reform including educational reform, the acquisition of citizenship and less ambiguous integration into the nation form afforded Caribbean women a broader context in which to confront capitalist patriarchy. Basically, the strides female workers made depended on having their labor power subjected to higher rates of exploitation, as witnessed by the broader range of higher education and technical skills.
many of them acquired, their integration with a broad range of professions, in environments where they have had to confront bastions of male privilege in the trade unions, political parties, and parliamentary institutions, the bureaucracy, industry and other sites of capitalist modernity.

Cecelia Green’s assertion about “a domestic mode of production” facing the “enclave–capitalist sectors in sharp contrast” (Green 2001: 46-49 passim) extends the conventional dependency discourse, which has been sidelined by post-development/globalization analyses. Implicitly, Green’s argument comports with neo-nationalist notions that locate the Caribbean in a contingent relationship with the global capitalist political economy, in ways that beg the question of an anarchical zero-sum world of cause and effect. It is romantic to invent BWI and CARICOM reality of a “domestic mode of production” reproducing itself in contrast with any enclave capitalist sector. Green would have to produce the empirical data to specify the nature of the relationship between the “domestic mode” and the “enclave-capitalist sector.” Green would have to indicate how the participants in this domestic “mode of production” reproduce themselves in relation to the externally imposed “enclave capitalist sector.” It is not clear what are the nature, character and driving forces within the “domestic mode of production.” The challenge is for Green to explain when and how the “enclave-capitalist sector” subverted the autonomy of the domestic mode, as well as how the domestic mode had propelled and reproduced the political economy up to that moment of its subversion. When did the Caribbean set up domestic modes of production that were autonomous of capitalism? If the “domestic mode of production” was non-capitalist, who were the agents that determined its rhythm and method of surplus extraction and accumulation?

The world according to NWG that Green privileges was an organic realm made up of seemingly geographically delimited nation-states. It approximated a disembodied, alienated world of center (metropole) and periphery (hinterland), a world bound by economistic logic of evolutionary economics with its Caribbean portion victimized by small size, openness, dependence, and underdevelopment. In this imaginary, the highest ambition of the citizens becomes the attainment and preservation of national sovereignty. Benn alludes to the conceptual and theoretical problems that haunt this romantic notion when he acknowledges that the political economy frameworks of NWG intellectuals were so permeated by the “analytical categories peculiar to … disciplines” like sociology and anthropology, that important questions remain “as to the extent to which these theoretical constructs accurately describe the existing West Indian reality” (2004: 269).
It is helpful to consider in relation to so-called “innovative” labor-intensive production the sizeable flows of migrants from the BWI and CARICOM are to Britain, from the late 1940s to the early 1960s, along with Caribbean migration to Canada and the USA, especially from the middle of the 1960s. The flows of West Indians to Britain and North America were evidence of skilled professional, technical, and kindred workers, including masses of rural and urban unskilled workers and unemployed people voting with their feet to escape various forms of labor-intensive work, chronic unemployment and underemployment, poverty and material backwardness. Those flows included sizeable elements from the floating, latent, and stagnant ranks within the West Indian reserve army of labor. United States immigration reform set in motion the conditions for meeting the changing labor requirements of postwar international capitalist expansion. The U.S. Immigration Reform Act of 1965 provided the legal framework to secure skilled and unskilled labor from non-European countries and linked labor needs to family reunification with implications for reproducing the labor force in the interest of private capital accumulation: immigration reform was central to the hegemonic strategy.

As professional, technical and kindred workers from the Caribbean were streaming to Britain and North America (US and Canada) in the face of chronic unemployment, NWG economists were insisting on “innovative” labor-intensive technology to solve unemployment problems, in spite of the fact that West Indian societies could not even employ their most highly trained and skilled workers. Capitalism reproduces the industrial reserve army of labor as an internal component within the capitalist production process. Clive Harris says the industrial reserve army is “inserted into production as a ‘lever’ of accumulation” mirroring the process of expansion, contraction, over-production—becoming smaller or larger, thus being recomposed on an ongoing basis.” Gender, race, and ethnicity function as internal factors within the patriarchal capitalist process and in conjunction with immigration of non-whites into countries like the United Kingdom they “combine and intersect internally … with class to produce ‘fractions’ or ‘segments’ within the proletariat.” Harris calls this a “process in which ideological, political and economic factors thread the industrial reserve army through the labor process with an assurance that certain elements will re-emerge again to join the relative surplus population” (1993: 11, 12; see Malik 1996: 18-35 passim).6

At the outset, West Indians arrived in Britain as colonial subjects whose labor power contributed to postwar capitalist restructuring. The postwar imperative of capital accumulation led the British state to try to secure “a steady supply of migrant labor at minimized costs” (Goldberg
2002: 85); however, the “constant clamor for a stop to black immigration” was not matched by an attempt to staunch the much larger flow of immigrants from Ireland” (Malik 1996: 23). The subjectivity of the West Indian military service men, who were represented among the British military and immigrant workers, made their labor power interchangeable units of universal human labor, while their racial-ethnic identity was overwhelmed by the racial identity that British racial Anglo-Saxonism imposed on them. One consequence of this contradictory location within the British proletariat was that their role as defenders of the Empire and as sources of surplus labor they contributed to capital accumulation in Britain and their remittances to the BWI/CARICOM societies seemed like epiphenomena in relation to the contradictory processes of international capitalism. W. Arthur Lewis appreciated something that NWG did not seem to grasp—he understood that the rhythm of postwar international capital accumulation would be decisive in mediating the fortunes of BWI labor in the Caribbean and beyond.

The point of introducing migration to Britain and North America has been to show that there is no theoretical or empirical justification to externalize the contradictions of historical capitalism by incongruously juxtaposing population to accumulation and a domestic mode of production to an “enclave-capitalist sector.” This unfortunate habit, which persists in Commonwealth Caribbean social science epistemology and social theorizing, reflects the influence of naturalistic materialism in the formulations of NWG dependency logic. This vision of an alienated, fetishized world in which the so-called core or metropole possesses the trappings of development with the periphery or hinterland trapped in underdevelopment makes it difficult to discern dynamic social relations of production within the actually existing spatially configured global capitalism. Europe did not insert the Caribbean and any so-called “domestic mode of production” into any pre-existing capitalist world economy. Largely, the modern Caribbean, which was created as an integral part of world capitalism, has borne all the characteristics of uneven development, which is integral to the fundamental capitalist process.

The ideology of “free market” capitalism surreptitiously disembeds the economy from social relations, in the process of separating the economy from politics, the individual from society, the national society and state from the international space (Polanyi 1944: 141). Integral to this form of disembedding is the way neoliberal market logic abstracts power, the state, and nation from the real capitalist social relations that are now global relations. In a variety of guises neo-Weberian historical sociology returns to fetishize the market to the point of sundering bourgeois relations
and producing the chimera of a national-global dualism of center (enclave capitalist sector) and periphery (domestic mode of production), which is consistent with bourgeois modernization ideology.

IV. CONCLUSION

Marx equated liberal thought to the idealized and fetishized reflection of the bourgeois life-world. In man ways, NWG thought was of a piece with strands of liberal thought in relation to modernization—decolonization, nationalism, independence, development, and sovereignty. It is difficult to sustain the assertion that NWG was innovative and rejected “metropolitan intellectual and political hegemony.” This is not to say NWG thought was bereft of any progressive notions, nor does it mean that NWG failed to contribute to theoretical discourse of the post-war transformation of the Caribbean. Given that all theory is for some particular purpose and that ideas do not sprout like “rhizomes”, we must ask which social strata in Caribbean society NWG thought benefited in any strategic sense. The plantation model was less innovative than assumed, as it romanticized the plantation partly by equating it to the core unit of analysis in the study of Caribbean economic life, more or less alienated from the fundamental processes of international capitalism.

On what grounds does an eclectic mix of mainly conservative nationalism and radical social democratic ideology that did little to point the way forward beyond naturalistic materialism equate to innovation? Social democratic thought differs with liberal ideology by degree rather than kind. NWG posed a number of important issues and helped to stimulate a reappraisal of the options that were open to West Indian societies in the process of modernization (decolonization) and intensive integration with international capitalism. Their contribution hardly served the interests of the international capital, BWI and CARICOM capitalist strata, the political rulers and their technocrats, the working classes, the semi-proletarianized small farmers, and the youth.

The core contribution from NWG thought lies in the notion that lies hidden in the “plantation model” discourse, according to which state power is not neutral in relation to economic development. Contextually, NWG thought implied that Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantages is part of an economic doctrine that the state and capital impose on those lacking any alternative to the prevailing social relations of production. More critically, NWG viewed the Ricardian theory of comparative advantages in terms of incongruously juxtaposed national and international societal contradictions by mistakenly sundering the internal relation between the state and capital in Caribbean capitalist societies. In their concern for finding ways to free
the Caribbean from the constraints imposed by powerful capitalists and their state institutions, NWG imagined the real Caribbean economy as distinct from the international economy, a romantic neo-nationalist preoccupation indeed! In many ways NWG thinkers did not see that world as it was, rather they saw it as they were as products of modernity’s disintegrating colonial and imperial order, the “knowledges” of which they criticized without transcending the “praxis of domination”—substantively, without achieving sublation in the direction of a theory of revolutionary praxis.

NOTES

1 Under CARICOM, the Nassau Understanding (1984) and the Grand Anse Declaration (1989) committed the CARICOM member countries to abandon the use of the common market and public policy to foster national and regional integration via import substitution (see Lewis 2003: 512).


3 Racial naturalism frames Rupert Lewis’ theoretical imagination (see Lewis 1998: 105 and passim).

4 Justin Rosenberg says, “for their part, US planners recognized by May 1942 that the ‘British Empire … will never reappear and that the United States may have to take its place’; that in light of growing nationalism there was a need to ‘avoid conventional forms of imperialism’ and that new institutions of international management, such as a united nations organization, should be developed to meet this need” (1994: 37).

5 Vaughan Lewis speaks of CARICOM losing “its integrity as a discreet entity” (2003: 515, see also pp. 516-17, 525). Frankly, in terms of its relationship to the international market and the global capitalist economy, CARICOM never possessed any substantive integrity as a discrete entity, except in a juridical (deontological) sense. CARICOM member countries’ preoccupation with the logic of formal sovereignty contributed to an immensely inflated sense of CARICOM’s importance in the global context. Havelock Brewster argues that after 30 years of CARICOM, there has been very little progress in terms of measurable economic integration. He says it is contradictory for CARICOM to expect to “create a Single Market and Economy with each member retaining maximum national sovereignty. It intends to do so apparently through a mode of discretionary inter-governmental cooperation. These objectives are clearly contradictory” (Brewster 2003: 501-504, 505).

6 Clive Harris notes that British “resistance to the use of Caribbean labour to resolve Britain’s ‘labour shortage’ “constitutes one of the “least documented chapters in British political and labour history” (1993: 21; see also Malik 1996: 19-24).
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